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AI is widely accepted as an ethical nightmare

Casey-Maslin 21(Stuart Casey Maslin 12-21, 2 international lawyer specialising in the use of force and the protection of civilians, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/right-to-life-under-international-law/832ED196FB17B46DA1AE50143290F038) Roho

introduction 19.01 This chapter considers whether the autonomous use of force is compatible with respect for and protection of the right to life. The development of artificial intelligence has given rise to autonomy from human beings in the decision to target individuals with force and the ability to kill them. While weapons systems incorporating features of automaticity of action and reaction have existed for many years, the ever-increasing sophistication – and phenomenal speed – of decision-making by machine mean that both as a means of warfare and in law enforcement, autonomous weapons systems may become commonplace in years to come. Indeed, the informal architect of the US Department of Defense’s first policy on autonomous weapons systems has claimed that the rise of artificial intelligence ‘will transform warfare’.1 Whether that is desirable or ethical2 is not considered hereunder; this chapter focuses on whether the use of autonomous weapons systems can comply with the right to life, and, if so, under which circumstances. 19.02 In this regard, with respect to the right to life under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3 (ICCPR), the UN Human Rights Committee has affirmed that ‘the development of autonomous weapon systems lacking in human compassion and judgment raises difficult legal and ethical questions concerning the right to life, including questions relating to legal responsibility for their use’.4 The Committee affirmed that ‘such weapon systems should not be developed and put into operation, either in times of war or in times of peace, unless it has been established that their use conforms with article 6 and other relevant norms of international law’.5 19.03 Thus the Committee did not consider autonomous weapon systems to be inherently ROHO unlawful; rather, it noted the requirement that their use be confirmed to comply with, in particular, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The duty to review new weapons for their potential compliance with international humanitarian law and other salient branches of international law is a customary rule6 that was first codified in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.7 19.04 In August 2020, Human RightsWatch asserted that ‘the challenge of killer robots [fully autonomous lethal weapons systems], like climate change, is widely regarded as a grave threat to humanity that deserves urgent multilateral action’.8 In support of this assertion, it refers to the endorsement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of both France and Germany of an ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’9 declaration concerning lethal autonomous weapons systems. Presented during theUNGeneral Assembly on 26 September 2019, with the support of several other nations including Canada, Chile, Ghana, Mexico, and Singapore, the declaration’s explicit support for the ‘Eleven Principles’ elaborated by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) created under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons10 (CCW) marked the first time such a high-level group has acknowledged concerns’ over fully autonomous weapons systems.11 The Eleven Principles include the stipulation that ‘human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines. This should be considered across the entire life cycle of the weapons system.’12 19.05 In September 2020, the influential Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)13 expressed its view, in a Working Paper submitted on its behalf by Venezuela in the context of the discussions under CCW auspices, that ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) raise several ethical, legal, moral and technical, as well as international peace and security related questions which should be thoroughly deliberated and examined in the context of conformity to international law including international humanitarian law and international human rights law.’14 The NAM further declared that it was ‘pleased’ that, while divergences remained, a ‘general sense has developed’ among States Parties to the CCW ‘that all weapons, including those with autonomous functions, must remain under the direct control and supervision of humans at all times and must comply with international law, including International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law’.15 19.06 With respect to the right to life under the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 the General Comment issued by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2015 was similarly normative. The General Comment declares that ‘any machine autonomy in the selection of human targets or the use of force should be subject to meaningful human control. The use of such new technologies should follow the established rules of international law.’17 This effectively outlaws the use of fully autonomous weapons systems, deeming them incompatible with the right to life. There has also been opposition from a great number of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics researchers. In an Open Letter published on the Future of Life Institute, the signatories declare that ‘we believe that AI has great potential to benefit humanity in many ways, and that the goal of the field should be to do so. Starting a military AI arms race is a bad idea, and should be prevented by a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control.’18 19.07 There are four main concerns about autonomous use of force under the right to life. First, it is questioned whether an autonomous weapons system is, or will ever be, capable of accurately identifying as a target only those individuals who may be lawfully targeted with force in the circumstances prevailing at the time. Second, it is interrogated whether a decision to use potentially lethal force may lawfully be left to a computer algorithm rather than to a human being. Third, it is unclear whether such a system is able to function in a manner that enables a person to be safely arrested with the minimum necessary use of force in a law enforcement operation or allows the acceptance of a surrender by a person participating directly in hostilities during an armed conflict, as the law of armed conflict/ international humanitarian law requires. Fourth, if a machine violates the applicable law, who is to be held accountable and on what legal basis? 19.08 Discussions on the issue of regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems (deliberately, if ironically, attracting the acronym ‘LAWS’) have been ongoing for several years in the context of the CCW. But these discussions have not crystallised in an agreement to negotiate a treaty to at least constrain, and possibly prohibit, such weapons systems as a means of warfare beyond the elaboration of the Eleven Principles.19 Moreover, the CCW has never been used as a forum to regulate the use of force in law enforcement. Indeed, the Eleven Guiding Principles, published in an annex to the report on the 2019 Session of the GGE considering the question under the auspices of the CCW, mention neither human rights nor situations of law enforcement.20 19.09 This chapter moves next to consider the definitions of autonomy and a fully autonomous weapon/lethal autonomous weapons system. The chapter then looks briefly at machine autonomy and the types of autonomous weapons systems that have either been procured and deployed or which are known to be under development. It considers their legality both under the right to life during peacetime or in law enforcement during armed conflict and as a means of warfare in the conduct of hostilities during and in connection with an armed conflict. key definitions 19.10 There is not – or at least not yet – an agreed definition under international law of either a fully autonomous weapon or a lethal autonomous weapons system. In November 2019, the report on discussions in the CCWnoted that no consensus existed among States Parties as to even the desirability of agreeing upon a definition. The report stated that ‘the concept of autonomy being a spectrum, . . . the difficulty of defining a clear point between semi- and fully autonomous systems was underlined’.21 19.11 Autonomy ordinarily means ‘freedom from external control or influence’.22 Aptly enough, as the Oxford English Dictionary recalls, the etymology of the word is from the Greek αυτο ομος, which means ‘having its own laws’.23 Or, in the rather wordier definition of autonomy proposed by the US Department of Defense in the context of weapons systems: ‘Autonomy is the computational capability for intelligent behavior that can perform complex missions in challenging environments with greatly reduced need for human intervention, while promoting effective man-machine interaction.’24 19.12 More straightforward was the Department of Defense’s proposed definition in 2012 of a (fully) autonomous weapons system: ‘a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator’.25 The definition, the Department of Defense confirmed, ‘includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation’.26 The definition, ‘elegant in its simplicity’, was praised by Brazil as being of ‘great usefulness’27 (although it wrongly ascribed the origin of the definition to a joint report of June 2020 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)).28 Brazil went on to offer its own, more ‘comprehensive’ definition of a lethal autonomous weapons system in its paper on definitions of August 2020: An intelligent weapon system with autonomous operation mode (i.e., without human input after activation) capable of recognizing patterns in combat environments, and of learning to operate and make decisions regarding the critical functions of target identification, tracking, locking-on and engaging based on uploaded databases, acquired experiences and its own calculations and conclusions. It is not certain, however, that this definition adds great clarity. In particular, are these capabilities to be regarded as alternatives or as cumulative prerequisites? 19.13 The United Kingdom’s definition of an autonomous weapons system is different from that of most other States and has not evolved over time. In 2011, the then UK Ministry of Defence doctrine on unmanned aerial systems declared that autonomous systems ‘will, in effect, be self-aware and their response to inputs indistinguishable from, or even superior to, that of a manned aircraft. As such, they must be capable of achieving the same level of situational understanding as a human.’29 Without that higher level of awareness, the United Kingdom regarded a system as ‘automated’. As Scharre observed, the differing UK stance was ‘not a product of sloppy language’, it was ‘a deliberate choice’. It enabled the United Kingdom to claim that autonomous weapons systems ‘do not, and may never, exist’.30 19.14 In 2017, in its later Joint Doctrine Publication, the Ministry of Defence similarly distinguished between automated and autonomous systems. Reiterating the glossary incorporated in its 2011 doctrine, an automated (or automatic) system was one that, ‘in response to inputs from one or more sensors, is programmed to logically follow a predefined set of rules in order to provide an outcome. Knowing the set of rules under which it is operating means that its output is predictable.’31 In contrast, an autonomous system is capable of understanding higher-level intent and direction. From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is able to take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not be.32

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