NATO won’t cooperation – no trust. US allies fail to see the US as a reliable partner on AI due to lack of confidence and strategies, domestic priorities, and desire to “win” against China.
Imbrie et al. ‘20 (Andrew Imbrie, Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Ryan Fedasiuk, Research Analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Catherine Aiken, Director of Data Science and Research at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Tarun Chhabra, nonresident fellow with the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; February 2022; “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI”; CSET; https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/)//akg
Our cross-national survey of government officials asked questions about national AI R&D priorities, international coordination and data sharing preferences, AI talent development strategies, and perceptions of other countries’ approaches to AI. Table 1 outlines the findings on national AI priorities. Officials cited four primary areas of concern around AI: domestic social and economic issues, domestic security, international security, and ethics. Domestic economic and social issues were the most prevalent area of concern, primarily labor market impacts and privacy. In terms of optimism, almost all officials focused on AI’s potential to advance domestic industry, services, and governance. Benefits for health, education, and infrastructure were especially prevalent. National R&D priorities focus on increasing research coordination and capabilities and boosting domestic industry. Priorities to advance capabilities included increasing investment, fostering technical innovation, establishing AI centers, developing international research initiatives, and training AI talent. Allies and partners prioritize AI R&D investments that support domestic ecosystems, with a focus on improving health, education, transportation, and public goods provision. AI R&D priorities are not determined solely by government actors; industry actors play an important role in the process, as well. Officials noted multiple channels for industry consultation and stressed that the voice of the private sector is important in shaping national AI strategies. Some officials highlighted that industry takes the lead in determining R&D priorities, with government backing and support. A few officials noted that national R&D priorities are still in flux, indicating room for U.S. leadership on this front. All surveyed officials indicated that they engage with international partners on AI-related issues. Bilateral efforts were the most cited avenue of international collaboration on AI, in four cases (EU, Australia, Czech Republic, and Italy) involving the United States. Multilateral fora were another common and increasingly relevant avenue for collaboration. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was the most cited multilateral forum, while multiple officials indicated engagement through the EU, Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty, or the newly created Global Partnership on AI (GPAI). Current international efforts focus on developing shared ethical standards, in part following the lead of the OECD and EU on defining AI standards. Other officials noted collaboration around workforce challenges, data policies, climate change, and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Partners’ active engagement and interest in international collaboration around AI is matched with positive perceptions of the United States’ role as an AI partner. Eighty percent of officials said their country considers the United States to be a reliable partner on AI issues. The remaining three officials, representing the EU, Germany, and France, suggested that while they consider the United States a like-minded ally and continue to value U.S. partnership, recent exchanges have been less fruitful and current approaches raise general concerns regarding U.S. reliability as an AI partner. Officials also rated the United States highly in terms of commitment to responsible use of AI with an average rating similar to the average rating of their own countries, or institutions, in the case of the EU, and a significantly higher rating than they assigned to China’s commitment to responsible AI (7.3, 7.9, and 3.8 out of 10, respectively). In citing obstacles to collaboration with the United States, officials were split between placing blame on the United States and on their own country. Multiple officials noted threats to industry and industrial competition, trade issues, different domestic priorities, or a lack of agreed upon strategy or common structures as obstacles to collaboration. Others specified that the U.S. desire to “win” relative to China, lack of data privacy protection, or unwillingness to engage inhibited collaboration. They also noted a lack of confidence in current U.S. goals or appropriate U.S. points of contact. Obstacles stemming from their own government included a lack of regulatory framework or set policies, alternative political priorities, a preference for multilateral fora, or insufficient resources. The survey results indicate that there is space for the United States to engage with international partners and, despite some specific but not insurmountable points of difference, a high degree of alignment on AI interests and priorities.