New cyber framework must have public-private partnership, info sharing, shared action, and regulations
Jason Smith, 2-22-2022, Jason Smith currently serves as service chair and as assistant professor for security studies at the National War College. He has served as a leader and aviator in the US Coast Guard and the US Army, as advisor to the commandant of the Coast Guard, as senior policy advisor in the US Senate, and on the staff of the National Security Council. "Forget a Whole-of-Government Cybersecurity Strategy—It’s Time for a Whole-of-Nation Approach," Modern War Institute, https://mwi.usma.edu/forget-a-whole-of-government-cybersecurity-strategy-its-time-for-a-whole-of-nation-approach/ //jsam
A whole-of-nation strategy needs to have clear objectives that are easily understood and actionable by the public and private sectors for the good of the American people. These objectives should include resiliency, redundancy, hardening, investigation, and sharing of information as a minimum. To meet those objectives a whole-of-nation strategic framework requires: True public-private partnership. This requires not only the private sector to trust the government with information that they consider vital, but also that the government must trusts the private sector with the information it needs. This means an equal exchange of information. Sharing ideas, techniques, and technology. Shared information about attacks themselves is only part of it. Allowing for a sharing of ideas, techniques, and technology is just as important. The government cannot afford to attract all the cyber experts into government jobs, nor should it want to; it needs the innovation and energy of the private sector. Bringing that innovation into the fold creates resources to counter our adversaries. Many in the private sector see the government as the enemy and their employees, shareholders, and customers protest when they partner with the government. This must be overcome by establishing a trusting environment. Shared action. The strategy may limit offensive cyber activities to government agencies, or it may include a limited licensing to a few trusted companies. This would not be as much a letter of marque as an avenue to seek permission to take one-time action on a target. Either way, all involved need to have visibility on actions taken and a voice—especially when it is the private sector that might take the brunt of any retaliation. Regulations. Although it is not popular with the private sector, government regulation will be required. Without it, incentives will not change and information sharing and investment in sound defenses will be hampered. Other nations will continue to see cyberattacks on both government and private sector targets as a cheap and effective way to counter the United States. The current whole-of-government response is full of noble intent, but it is not a winning strategy. It fails to take advantage of the resources and expertise in the private sector that a whole-of-nation response can. The United States’ free economy, and the incentives it brings, gives it a competitive advantage over its adversaries, but only if it actively engages with private sector actors and convinces them that a whole-of-nation response is in their best interest.