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NATO is key for a unified response.

Ricart ‘22, [ Raquel Jorge is Analyst at Elcano Royal Institute working on the technology and digital agenda, she holds a Master’s in Security Policy, with a concentration in technology and cybersecurity] "Beyond NATO’s Madrid Summit: the technological challenge," Real Instituto Elcano, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/beyond-nato-madrid-summit-the-technological-challenge/-- AL

First, it will be strategic to make a list of priorities on EDTs in two ways. NATO has already defined seven priority areas, but for each of them it would be advisable to specify their level of criticality. A distinction needs to be made between critical, significant, limited impact and ‘peripheral’ technologies. This is no simple task. It is an effort already developed by some allied countries, such as the recently updated US White House list of critical technologies. The second approach to prioritising some EDTs over others is to make an assessment of the contribution these EDTs make to Alliance defence and security in the short, medium and long terms. Delineating these timeframes can help allocate resources efficiently and avoid potential duplication. This is beneficial both for NATO and for Allies individually, and could prevent the lack of coordination and coherence found in the Inspector General’s 2020 audit on AI projects being developed in the US Department of Defense. Moreover, it is not only beneficial at the tactical level: it can also improve strategic decision-making when it comes to determining what role NATO should play in deterring certain technological developments by third countries. The second challenge is to make innovation projects flexible and agile. The DIANA mechanism will focus on deep technologies, which are the seven priority areas the Alliance has already identified (artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space), making it necessary for start-ups, research teams and technology companies participating in the network of accelerators and testing centres in more than 20 allied countries to reinvent their projects in the event of failure or non-delivery. Many of the partner countries are also members of the EU. The EU-NATO Joint Declaration is expected to be published later this year to identify lines of cooperation. The NATO Innovation Fund, which is the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund, DIANA, and the EU’s European Innovation Council should work together to enable specialised but small start-ups to grow smoothly. Finally, perception will also be important. Non-NATO countries from the Asia-Pacific area will attend the Madrid Summit, including Australia, Korea, Japan and New Zealand. The first and third cooperate bilaterally with the US through the Quad, Australia already does so through AUKUS and the EU is working on Digital Partnership Agreements with Korea and Japan. Given this multiplicity of initiatives, ensuring mutual trust and confidence in technology projects –within NATO– will be important for their long-term sustainability. Moreover, discussions in recent years about creating a potential NATO policy on China are still incomplete and will be a sensitive issue, as countries have different views on how to engage with China politically, militarily and technologically. In conclusion, the Strategic Concept 2022 is a window of opportunity. And, as such, it will reveal many challenges. Working from the outset with a holistic approach will be a necessary condition for success.

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