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American Primacy in Asia is a waste of time and resources

Roggeveen ’21 (Sam Roggeveen, Director of the Lowy Institute's International Security Program, “The price of American hegemony in Asia,” IPS Journal. 29/9/21. https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/the-price-of-american-hegemony-in-asia-5449/)

Nobody doubts that China is the driving motivation for AUKUS. If China was not undergoing the most rapid maritime modernisation of any country since the US Navy under the Reagan Administration, it is difficult to imagine that Washington would have agreed to sell nuclear technology it has only once before shared with a foreign partner (the UK). Australia has been content to demonstrate its fidelity to its alliance with the US by supporting Washington’s security goals in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Yet that still leaves open a critical question about US grand strategy: are agreements such as AUKUS designed to further America’s ultimate aim of maintaining its status as unrivalled strategic leader of Asia, or is the US willing to share power with China? It is easy to make a case for the first interpretation, at least based on what the United States says. The Trump Administration’s Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, declassified in January 2021, says plainly that the uppermost challenge for US policy in the region is ‘how to maintain US strategic primacy’. President Biden said in March 2021 that ‘China has an overall goal [...] to become [...] the most powerful country in the world [...] That’s not going to happen on my watch’. Yet rhetoric has not been matched by action. America’s military footprint in Asia hasn’t grown much over the last decade, especially when compared to the rapid rise of Chinese military capacity. Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia, announced in 2011, is widely acknowledged to have been under-resourced. In that context, AUKUS can be seen a strong sign of American commitment to containing China. Nuclear propulsion technology is closely guarded, so this is much more than an ordinary arms deal; it is a major commitment of American technology. And if primacy is the goal, then Australia has made its clearest commitment yet to supporting it. Australia has been content to demonstrate its fidelity to its alliance with the US by supporting Washington’s security goals in the Middle East and Afghanistan. China clearly means to revise what it regards as a Western imposed rules-based order, and it would probably like to push the US out of the region altogether. It has, however, been less forthright when it comes to issues that directly affect Chinese interests. For instance, despite American encouragement, Australia has still not conducted freedom of navigation missions within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea. It joined China’s international development bank while Washington remained suspicious. And in 2019 the suggestion that the US might ask Australia to host American intermediate-range missiles on its territory was met with a swift denial by the Morrison Government. That period of reticence appears to be over. As well as the submarine deal, the Australian government is encouraging speculation about permanent American bases in Australia. Is American primacy in Asia worth it? What’s troubling about this is that it implies full confidence in America’s ability to win such a contest for leadership in Asia, and that Australia must do what it can to ensure victory. But China is the biggest challenger the US has ever faced. As former Brookings scholar and now China adviser in the National Security Council Rush Doshi has observed, in the last century no American adversary or coalition of adversaries has ever reached 60 percent of US GDP. China passed that mark as early as 2014. It’s an arresting statistic, which should encourage Australian policy-makers to ask if the maintenance of American primacy in Asia is a realistic or even worthwhile goal. US primacy has certainly been advantageous for Australia, but the price of keeping America at the top is now rising dramatically. European powers should also be asking themselves about their interests in Asia. Australia’s decision to commit to either American or British nuclear-powered submarines meant that the deal to buy French boats had to be cancelled, leading to much introspection about France’s future role in the Pacific. Britain’s involvement in AUKUS has also raised questions about its ambitions in this part of the world. In June, NATO identified China as a ‘systemic challenger’. But it is difficult to see what vital strategic interest is at stake for NATO and the European powers in Asia. China clearly means to revise what it regards as a Western imposed rules-based order, and it would probably like to push the US out of the region altogether. However, that is not enough reason for Europe to involve itself in a power struggle against a nation that offers massive economic opportunity, but which poses no military threat to Europe.

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