NATO already has multiple means of countering disinformation, including set processes and widescale strategies to ensure response
Robbins ’20 (Joseph Robbins (PhD, Texas Tech University) is the political science department head at Valdosta State University. His research examines Post-Communist party system development and, more recently, the consequences of terrorist attacks; his research has been published in journals such as Armed Forces & Society; Comparative Politics; Comparative Political Studies; Conflict, Security, and Development; Electoral Studies; Global Policy; the Journal of East European and Asian Studies; the Journal of Peace Research; Legislative Studies Quarterly; Party Politics; and Terrorism & Political Violence), “Countering Russian Disinformation”, from “The Diversity of Russia’s Military Power,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020) , resrep26533.8.pdf (jstor.org)
Recognizing this threat, in 2018 the European Council endorsed a plan to counter Russian cyber threats, which included the creation of the Rapid Alert System.139 It serves as a clearinghouse of sorts for member states to share information and concerns regarding suspected disinformation campaigns and to discuss “best practices” in responding to these malicious campaigns. The RAS then shares authoritative accounts in response to false or misleading messaging that can be disseminated by the EU member states, civil society groups, and social media companies. This mechanism has been used against Covid-19 disinformation campaigns that have spread harmful information regarding the pandemic and dangerous or unproven remedies to the disease.140 As a multilateral, multilevel organization, the RAS has great potential to help counter Russian disinformation campaigns but it has been hampered by inconsistent participation by members, uneven real-time responses to threats, and concerns over ideologically motivated responses.141 NATO has also been targeted by Russian disinformation, as the Kremlin looks to sow discord and fuel animus toward the organization amid the Covid-19 pandemic.142 False stories were spread regarding NATO’s intent to withdraw troops from Lithuania, Canadian troops allegedly exposing Latvia to the virus, and a Polish military official reportedly criticizing U.S. military forces. These stories aim to undermine NATO’s legitimacy and support as well as weaken individual member states. Back in 2008, Estonia led a NATO effort to create the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) following Russia’s 2007 massive cyberattack on the Baltic nation. The CCDCOE consists of 28 member states, including the Czech Republic and Estonia, and supports a comprehensive strategy to counter cyber threats. The CCDCOE supports its mission through interdisciplinary methods to study, train, and organize exercises to fortify cyber defense. Its Locked Shields exercise is one such example of how it promotes cyber defense across teams to ensure that experts and decisionmakers are working together on these threats.143 These efforts extend beyond disinformation alone but can contribute to ongoing efforts to curtail this influence. NATO has employed other efforts to counter disinformation. In addition to CCDCOE’s work, STRATCOM aims to raise awareness of information operations and refute misleading or false claims. Its analytical reports summarize tactics, messaging, and targets of Russian disinformation.144 The organization mobilized in earnest in the wake of the Crimean annexation and since 2014 has expanded its efforts to help NATO members identify false or misleading narratives, recognize networked or coordinated Russian media activity, and increase audience resilience when targeted by the Kremlin.145 STRATCOM’s coordinated efforts are vitally important to enhance the collective security of its member states and to counter disinformation efforts levied against NATO as a whole Conclusion This article underscores a few effective methods to counter disinformation operations at both the national and international levels. Estonia’s use of real-time volunteer forces along with the Czech Republic’s BIS and think tanks are useful in naming and shaming Russia’s digital active measures. Meanwhile, Estonia’s use of government-sanctioned programming can help shape the broadcast conversation, thus countering channels like RT, which further harmful narratives. The NATO and EU responses to Russia’s ongoing efforts to sow discord offer some useful suggestions for moving forward. These organizations have created task forces and organizations that, collectively, reveal a holistic framework that can help uncover subversive efforts, coordinate a cogent response, and promote multilateral collaboration. With additional buy-in from EU and NATO members, these efforts will evolve and strengthen the response to disinformation operations.