NATO is losing its technological edge – action now key to ensure future deterrence and warfighting tactics against adversaries
Jankowski ‘21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 83-84. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ
Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) seem simultaneously trendy, powerful, and mysterious. They are often perceived as carrying the potential to revolutionize governmental structures, economies, and life as one knows it. At the same time, scholars and policymakers emphasize that “these technologies may also promote international instability: for instance, by leading to a swift redistribution of wealth around the world; a rapid diffusion of military capabilities or by heightening the risks of military escalation and conflict.”1 For past decades, NATO and its Allies have enjoyed a technological edge, which has underpinned their collective military security – an advantage resulting from their collective economic, industrial, and academic strengths. NATO’s technological edge has always been an essential enabler of its ability to deter and defend against actual and potential adversaries. In October 2019, NATO Defence Ministers expressed concern that this advantage can no longer be taken for granted. In fact, NATO was in danger of losing its technological edge due to a combination of factors, among them a growing determination from peer competitors, especially Russia and China, to drive the future of advanced technologies, including military applications. Availability and knowledge of EDTs, enhanced by rising defence budgets, have provided NATO’s adversaries with capabilities to challenge the Alliance politically, militarily, and technologically. Allowing adversaries to gain competitive advantage in the EDTs area would impede NATO’s ability to win on the battlefield, challenge strategic stability, and change the fundamentals of deterrence. For NATO, EDTs are primarily of interest through their influence on current and future defence capabilities, as well as on deterrence and defence posture. It is clear that EDTs will affect many of the foundations of deterrence strategy. Indeed, new military technologies will play a crucial role in future warfighting and building forces that can decisively operate across domains. At the same time, deeply strategic and practical understanding of the significance of EDTs and their diffusion, as well as extending thinking concerning how science, technology, and international social relations interact to shape and facilitate management of the changing global security landscape, is a pressing need for NATO in the upcoming decade.2