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Plan ensures that a democratic AI model is credible – cooperation spills over to challenge the China’s authoritarianism.

Imbrie et al. ‘20 (Andrew Imbrie, Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Ryan Fedasiuk, Research Analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Catherine Aiken, Director of Data Science and Research at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; Tarun Chhabra, nonresident fellow with the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution; Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology; February 2022; “HOW THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES CAN DELIVER A DEMOCRATIC WAY OF AI”; CSET; https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/)//akg

The United States has a vested interest in setting the rules of the road for artificial intelligence. Western countries have already taken the lead in developing principles governing the application of artificial intelligence. China has produced its own set of principles and engages actively in international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), to establish standards for mobile network technologies and the future governance of AI. By assuming leadership in AI, the United States and its allies face risks and opportunities. The risks are twofold. On the one hand, standard setting could become a casualty of geopolitical competition as leading countries precipitate a race to the bottom. On the other hand, China already asserts its principles and standards through a variety of multilateral fora. The opportunity is that the United States and its allies can act now to set global standards for AI reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal democratic values, while addressing critical questions surrounding the rollout of 5G, facial recognition for surveillance, automated cyber exploitation and defense, and autonomous weapons systems. A Japanese official responding to the CSET survey noted that the United States and its allies should adopt a citizen-centric AI strategy. Such citizen-centric strategies would seek to develop and deploy AI for the benefit of democratic societies, including strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens within rules-based market economies; greater access to education, precision medicine, energy efficiency, and more inclusive social service provision. The United States should lead a multilateral effort with allies and partners to set international rules of conduct for AI. This effort should build on and extend the OECD Principles on AI and the International Organization for Standardization working group initiatives on standards for data and AI safety and security. The United States and its allies could establish a standing platform to coordinate policies on standard-setting in multilateral fora. This is likely an area for productive dialogue, as partners are eager to coordinate policies and share best practices around norms and standards. In fact, all surveyed officials were extremely or very interested in this avenue for international collaboration. Longer term, the United States and its allies should explore the conditions for a common AI market, including standards for testing, verification, and validation of AI technologies, as well as common practices for certifying companies that support liberal democratic values and privacy.87 This common market would create incentives for other countries to abide by these principles in the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. As one EU representative observed, if the West could offer a viable way of doing AI that respects privacy and fundamental rights, developing (and democratic) countries would be more inclined to follow the Western model. Optimal Partners: Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Singapore, and Japan Center for Security and Emerging Technology 33 Multilateral Fora: EU, OECD, International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission Joint Technical Committee 1 Sub Committee 42 – Artificial Intelligence, WTO, 3GPP, NATO-EU joint initiative on standards for emerging technologies Criteria for Partnership: To lead the global discussion on AI safety and ethics, the United States will need to build a coalition of like-minded, influential countries from which it can listen and learn and with whom it can shape norms and standards. Ideal partners will be countries that host active and engaged civil societies, who have historically aligned with liberal democratic values and U.S. policy priorities, and who most actively collaborate internationally to develop AI norms and standards. Allies that more frequently use information and communication technologies, issue governance documents about AI, and host robust public sector discussions about AI and image recognition are optimal partners for shaping global norms, standards, and best practices around these technologies. For one measure of technology use, we included the World Economic Forum’s Government Usage of ICT index, as well as a count of national AI governance documents provided by Nesta.88 We also measured commitment to a democratic way of AI by canvassing national AI strategies for mentions of “principles,” “norms,” “standards,” and “safety.” To measure international clout and diplomatic capacity, we captured the number of diplomatic posts each country operates worldwide, as well as their ranks on the Soft Power 30 Index.89 Finally, we recorded countries’ demonstrated willingness to ban technology imports from Huawei Technologies as a proxy for their willingness to work with the United States.90 Other considerations and caveats: The United States will need to expand cooperation beyond the aforementioned countries to promote liberal democratic norms and standards for AI. Sweden and New Zealand were among the top-scoring countries for this initiative. As the world’s largest democracy, India is also an important partner in this effort. Policymakers will need to weigh additional considerations: countries that generate a high quantity of policy documents about AI may not make for optimal partners if these documents do not align with U.S. values and policy priorities. What’s more, many national guidelines mention or touch on AI but are not directly related to AI, and data is not widely available for non-Anglophone countries. Initiative 10: Establish a multilateral digital infrastructure network. One of the chief attractions of Chinese-supplied consumer technologies (5G, cell phones, computers, digital wallets) is that they are less expensive than Western equivalents, and market access is often a condition for Chinese companies investing in developing countries. For example, some allies and partners are reluctant to ban Huawei for fear of losing access to the Chinese market and investments. Even among partners, the appeal of cost effectiveness sometimes outweighs considerations of privacy and security. The CSET survey found that cost effectiveness matters more than privacy for international agreements around software contracts. Yet privacy matters more among partners for international agreements around data storage and sharing. Surveyed officials were split in terms of the relative importance of privacy and cost for international agreements around novel applications and hardware investment. Germany, Australia, and the EU tended to favor privacy in all cases, while Colombia and the Czech Republic tended to favor cost effectiveness when considering international collaboration. To promote a rules-based global trading order, the United States should not mimic China’s model of state-driven, top-down national development strategies that trade investment for market access. Instead, the United States should form a multilateral consortium to coordinate the extension of credit to European mobile telecommunications networks and invest in next-generation networks.91 The United States and its allies should also launch a multilateral digital infrastructure network. This network could be modeled on USAID’s Higher Education Solutions Network, a partnership between USAID and development labs at seven major universities, and the EU’s Digital4Development policy, an initiative that harnesses information and communications technologies to promote sustainable development.92 A multilateral digital infrastructure network would enable the United States and its allies to partner with developing countries to build digital capacity in support of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The right approach would ensure that digital systems in emerging markets are open, secure, resilient, and interoperable, while empowering developing countries to protect data privacy, meet their domestic needs, and access high-performance computing and mobile internet technologies. Liberal democratic governments have established frameworks and standards for good governance tied to development lending and giving. Democratic countries should include AI in these frameworks along with capacity building to ensure that developing countries can make sovereign and democratically accountable decisions about the deployment of AI. Many developing countries are growth markets and present opportunities to shape AI governance consistent with liberal democratic principles. As part of this effort, the United States and its allies should integrate federated learning techniques and data privacy into digital capacity building efforts with developing countries. By creating an accelerator fund for privacy-preserving 36 Center for Security and Emerging Technology machine learning technologies, the United States and its allies could promote an alternative model of development that puts data protection and privacy at the absolute center. Optimal Partners: Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Canada Multilateral Fora: IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, and Digital Nations (The Digital 9) Criteria for Partnership: The best partners for investing in global digital infrastructure are countries that lead in foreign aid and consider technology to be a staple of development and governance. We measured outflows of official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) from each country. We considered three indices of governments’ commitment to technology and global development: the UN e-Government Development Index, the Digital Evolution Index, and “technology” scores on the Commitment to Development Index.93 We also included a measure from our survey: expressed concern around China’s investments in the developing world. Other considerations and caveats: Other high-scoring countries included South Korea and Sweden for their commitments to digital development. It is also important to consider the optimal destinations for digital infrastructure support. Ideal recipients would be countries at risk of becoming dependent on Chinese technology and monetary assistance, for whom price is a prohibitory factor in buying from companies based in the United States and allied countries. As of this writing, China’s Belt and Road Initiative encompasses more than 60 countries.94 Conclusion How can the United States collaborate with allies and partners to shape the trajectory of artificial intelligence in ways that will promote liberal democratic values and protect against efforts to wield AI for authoritarian ends? This question is both important and urgent. It is important because America’s broad network of alliances and security partnerships is a singular asset in defending liberal values. It is urgent because China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI and the export of censorship and surveillance technologies to countries across the globe.1 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion and stifle dissent.2 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. All democratic nations must work together to uphold basic principles, set international rules of the road, and articulate a positive vision for the future in the age of AI. Within the United States, and certainly within allied countries, debate persists over the threat of digital authoritarianism and how to counter it. While U.S. allies will likely vary in their strategic orientations toward China and Russia, there is a growing consensus on the need to showcase a democratic way of AI. These debates will take shape in a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains. In this context, the right U.S. approach would leverage its network of allies and partners to safeguard democracy and liberal values. An alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. The United States and its allies should play to their strengths. This positive agenda begins with shaping the ecosystems for the development and deployment of safe and reliable AI. The most effective approach would capitalize on advances in AI and machine learning to foster sustainable and inclusive economic growth, improve service delivery, and promote transparent and accountable governance. The United States and its allies should pursue a vision of the future in which AI enables strengthened data privacy standards and respect for civil liberties; economic empowerment of citizens within rules-based market economies; cleaner, safer, and more efficient transportation; precision medical diagnosis; greater access to education; and more effective disaster response.

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