NATO action urgent – they need to defend their tech edge
Jankowski 21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 96-99. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ
NATO’s approach to EDTs should be based on three key objectives: Retain the technological edge Maintain the core values of the Alliance Ensure that no potential adversary gains a strategic, asymmetric advantage over NATO that could undermine the deterrence and defence posture The potential EDTs implications for NATO’s deterrence and defence remain of primary importance. Indeed, EDTs will provide a greater range of tools for adversaries to challenge and find weaknesses in NATO’s posture. At the same time, ease of commercial access to EDTs raises the prospect of new – increasingly confident – state and non-state actors to contest NATO, particularly with increased challenges of attribution. Table 2 presents an overview of the EDTs impact on NATO’s posture, including both challenges and opportunities. **Table 2 omitted** Moreover, based on the four broad inter-related trends presented earlier in this study, one can identify the most critical implications for NATO’s deterrence and defence. First, the maturation of the precision-strike regime appears to favour the denial of most domains relative to the ability to gain control over them. The dominant force elements of the Allied armed forces can be held at risk with precision-guided missiles for a fraction of those platforms’ costs. Yet, Allies could exploit cross-domain precision weapons to deny an opponent the ability to project power intra-regionally. By developing the “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities, frontline states – including on NATO’s eastern flank – could considerably strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence. In this context, one should note that trends in precision-strike warfare call into question NATO’s preference for expeditionary defence whereby forces are dispatched reactively to reinforce frontline states. Second, disrupting an adversary’s battle network should be treated as a major warfighting mission. In doing so, the Allied armed forces will need to reduce their vulnerabilities to network attacks while improving their abilities to operate in environments where radio-frequency interference will be a likely condition. Moreover, the security of Allied military supply chains – especially with regards to semiconductor production and 5G networks – will demand greater attention as a consequence of the competition between battle networks. Finally, the struggle between opposing battle networks will hinge on the contests for control of space and cyberspace – both crucial for military surveillance, warning, battle management, and communications. Third, the contestation of space and cyberspace will require new missions for protecting assets and holding hostile systems at risk within those domains. Allies will also observe a growing use of space to deny operations in other domains. This will entail closer space cooperation between Allies in order to enhance strategic solidarity and complicate efforts by an aggressor to target the space capabilities. Fourth, the supplanting of human forces by highly autonomous machines could offer NATO a path to significantly reduce the cost of training forces to the point where they are able to achieve “first battle competence.” Autonomous systems may also offer Allies affordable means of regaining forward combat power in conflicts on the periphery of great power rivals through more distributed, swarming, and expandable forces. Table 3 offers an overview of the military implications on NATO of selected EDTs.