Russia developing AI to challenge NATO – they will engage in new security cooperation and disruptive strategies
Jankowski 21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 90-96. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ
Russian EDTs Development Russia has been closely monitoring the United States as well as China’s technological priority areas while evaluating their long-term consequences and searching for means to counter them. According to Michael Raska, the current Russian EDTs strategy has been based on two elements. First, the strategy must counter the third offset strategy with the first offset strategy, which means prioritizing the development of a wide array of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems: “In Russian strategic thought, maintaining a variety of sophisticated nuclear weapons can invalidate any conventional advantages of the United States, NATO, and China. Ensuring that Russia remains a nuclear superpower is the basis of all Russian security policies. Moscow has never ceased the development of strategic and tactical weapon systems even during the darkest days of 1990s, and indeed accelerated research and development during the period of swift economic growth in the 2000s.”15 Indeed, for Russia nuclear weapons are the most cost-effective pillar of strategic deterrence. Second, Russia began to counter numerous U.S. and Chinese technological initiatives using similar indigenous programs, although more narrowly focused and smaller in scale. In October 2012, Russia established the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF).16 As emphasized by Michael Raska, “the ARF focuses on R&D of high-risk, high-pay-off technologies in areas that include hypersonic vehicles, artificial intelligence, additive technologies, unmanned underwater vehicles, cognitive technologies, directed energy weapons, and others. While Russian technologies are at the early stages in some areas, in key areas such as directed energy weapons, rail gun, hypersonic vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles, programs are progressing into advanced stages, backed by considerable financing for many years prior to the ARF.”17 However, the challenge for Russia remains sustained resource allocation to transform these disruptive technologies into actual military capabilities. Due to its current relationship with the West, one should expect that Russia will try to establish new industrial partnerships with major non-Western countries, primarily India and China. The goal of the potential cooperation will be to secure financing and technological cooperation on these projects. In fact, “Russia has already had a positive experience with India (BrahMos cruise missile joint production venture), and has embarked on two major joint programs with the Chinese – a wide-body passenger aircraft and advanced heavy helicopter programs. The interest in establishing the new joint programs with the Chinese is especially strong in the Russian space industry. The purchase of Chinese space-grade microchip production technology in exchange for RD-180 liquid-fuel rocket engine technology is under negotiation and may start a new stage in Sino-Russian cooperation.”18 The results of the Russian Science and Technology Foresight – a full-fledged study targeted at the identification of the most promising areas of science and technology development in Russia as it nears 2030 – revealed that in numerous areas Russia is lagging behind the world leaders. Foresight 2030 covered seven priority areas: Information and communication technologies Biotechnology Medicine and health New material and nanotechnologies Rational use of nature Transportation and space systems Energy efficiency and energy saving19 In information and communication technologies, Russia occupies advanced positions in areas like “New data transfer, networking, and content distribution technologies.” However, it lags behind global leaders in most fields, in particular “Computer-aided element base design technologies” or “New data transfer technologies.”20 With regard to biotechnology, the most advanced areas of applied research in Russia identified in the study include “High-performance techniques for genome, transcriptome, proteome, and metabolome analysis,” as well as “Systematic and structural biology.”21 When it comes to medicine and health, Russia has as yet made only modest progress in human organs regeneration. Nevertheless, according to Gokhberg, et al., Russia’s best chances to achieve sound practical results are in such fields as “Biocompatible biopolymeric materials” and “Techniques for fast identification of toxic substances and pathogens.”22 Unlike most of the other priority areas, the level of research and development in new material and nanotechnology in Russia is assessed as high, particularly in such fields as “Nano-size catalysts for deep processing of raw materials” and “Nano-structured membrane materials.”23 Finally, in transportation and space systems, the research and development fields with the highest domestic competitive advantage include “Development of research models to study transport situation in the Arctic and subarctic areas” and “Development of air- and spacecraft to launch suborbital small-size space satellites.”24 At the same time, Russia is speeding up its work on artificial intelligence. President Vladimir Putin has said on numerous occasions that the leader in the field of AI would become “the master of the world.” In October 2019, Russia adopted a National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Through 2030. According to Elena Chernenko and Nikolai Markotkin, Sberbank president German Gref was the driving force behind the strategy, and the stateowned bank prepared a roadmap for developing AI in Russia.25 In November 2019, the internet giants Yandex and Mail.ru Group, along with Gazprom Neft energy company, MTS, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund, formed a structure known as the AI Russia Alliance which is tasked with promoting Russia’s AI-based technologies. The alliance is expected to coordinate the efforts of the business and scientific communities to achieve the objectives set forth in the national AI strategy. Therefore, as Elena Chernenko and Nikolai Markotkin emphasize, in the near future the driving force behind Russian AI technologies will be commercial investment, with large IT companies – rather than start-ups – being in the driver’s seat. Still, the military sector is one of the strongest in terms of developing Russian AI. Increasingly, Russian military specialists in the field of AI applications are making advances in the use of such technologies, primarily in the maritime context. As Roger McDermott underscores, “Moscow’s interests in the use of AI to further develop maritime military capabilities relates to the future development of surface and sub-surface platforms that will be fully roboticized. Alongside this longer-term ambition is the use of situational analysis technology to ensure that naval commanders gain an advantage in time and space over a potential adversary by using the AI system to foresee the development of any situation within an operational environment, thus helping to gain the initiative. However, this is taking place within a much wider context of Moscow’s increasingly proactive interest in using AI technologies, which is changing the face of its conventional military capability and will do so for years to come.”26 The extent to which Moscow has prioritized, developed, and continued to plan future advances in applying AI within the military has to a large degree been underestimated by the West. With the introduction of AI in the fields of maritime security, engine production, or in enhancing command and control, there is no doubt that AI is finding expanding roles in the Russian Armed Forces. In this context, one should stress that Russia is a technologically advanced country in the design and development of armaments, even if its manufacturing and budgetary capacity has seldom matched its strategic ambition. Indeed, it is important not to underestimate the strength and resilience of Russia’s scientific community and innovation potential. Russian advantage is its ability to match technology with the applicable operational concepts and force and command structures. In fact, Russia has been able to use both symmetrical and asymmetrical means and methods of warfare. As Katarzyna Zysk emphasizes, “the objective has been to undermine or circumvent the opponent’s military-technological superiority and exploit its vulnerabilities, preferably in a cost-effective manner politically and economically.”27 Therefore, disruptive technologies should not be seen in isolation from disruptive strategies. In fact, technologies enable strategies. With Russia, one needs to consider not only advances in high technology for traditional military applications, but also innovations and uses below the level of declared war. Russia’s premier disruptive strategy is intimidation – to instill the awe and terror of war in adversaries in order to weaken and fracture them, all while using technology as an enabler. In peacetime, they intimidate opponents through various psychological methods, from disinformation to targeted nuclear exercises. In wartime, they use surprise and deception and are prepared to undertake asymmetric operations to destabilize, overwhelm, and fracture the adversary. Indeed, Philip Breedlove and Margaret E. Kosal insist that “understanding Russian approaches to technology development would not be complete without acknowledging the role that dezinformatsiya, disinformation, and maskirovka, military deception, play in interactions with external actors.”28