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Russia’s trying to jump ahead in technological warfare

Zysk ’20 (Katarzyna Zysk; Katarzyna Zysk is a professor of international relations and contemporary history at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), which is part of the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) in Oslo; “Defence innovation and the 4th industrial revolution in Russia,” Taylor Francis Online, December 8 2020; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1856090?cookieSet=1)-amc

The Russian General Staff attaches critical importance to winning and holding information superiority and influencing the cognitive-psychological domain, seen as key in any contemporary conflict. Influence operations and other forms of AI-enabled and AI-augmented ‘information confrontation’ (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo) exploiting new forms and roles of information and social interaction are set to play an increasingly prominent role in Russia’s military strategy. Sergei Chvarkov, professor at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, points that cyber weapons have several critical advantages and in some cases may be many times more effective than physical destruction by conventional weapons; moreover, threats and attacks in the information sphere are hard to retaliate against. The exploitation of big data is likely to play a significant role in enhancing existing and creating new means of confrontation. It requires creating an infrastructure and conditions for big data harvesting, considered by the Russian authorities? a key factor in AI development. To this end, the Russian national AI strategy clearly states that priority in accessing big data will be given to state actors. Russia has also demonstrated interest in combining new technologies, such as AI and drones, in order to augment traditional methods of influence operations such as disinformation, demoralisation and propaganda. Specially developed Russian drones and cell site simulators have been able to impersonate cell phone towers with the objective of intercepting, jamming, spoofing or broadcasting tailored content on civilian mobile phones belonging to the opposing side. Russia has tested such systems in operations in Eastern Ukraine and Syria by delivering content to cell phones of opposing fighters. Based on information harvested from the smartphones, the projected content was intended to harass, intimidate and undermine morale, for instance by revealing seemingly compromising details about the adversary’s commanders or divulging knowledge about soldiers’ own families. Such methods have also been used against NATO soldiers deployed in the Baltic republics as a part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, apparently for similar influence operation purposes. Furthermore, Russia has been investing in counter-network capabilities that could disrupt or degrade the backbone of the US and NATO information technology-enabled warfare, critical infrastructures (C4ISR), including space-based systems, command and operational networks, and other complex technological warfare enablers that developed countries depend on. The Russian Aerospace Forces, created in 2015, integrate the previously separated offensive and defensive capabilities, including air defence, missile defence, offensive electronic warfare, anti-space capabilities (such as anti-satellite missiles and manoeuvring space robots), and directed energy weapons, such as the abovementioned Peresvet. They are likely to play key role in crisis and conflict, including regional war scenarios.

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