Complexity, conflicting interpretations, and fights over intel sharing block agreement
Arts ’18 [Sophie; December 13; senior program coordinator for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund; "Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy," https://www.gmfus.org/publications/offense-new-defense-new-life-natos-cyber-policy]
While the United States’ announcement that it would contribute its capabilities could help lend credibility to NATO’s cyber deterrence, further clarification is needed within NATO, particularly when it comes to its command structure in the cyber domain. Without clarity on this front, it is hard to imagine that the 29 NATO allies who have different threat perceptions, and face issues of cohesion and trust, could agree on effective response scenarios in a crisis situation. This is particularly critical, because cyber operations will be subject to political approval by the NATO allies.
The new Cyber Operations Center, which should be fully operational in 2023, could play an important role in that respect, but the lack of operational authority may pose a significant challenge.37 According to NATO, the center aims to “strengthen cyber defenses and integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations.”38 But as the U.S. declaration on its potential cyber support to NATO confirms, it appears at this point that the center will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations. This, coupled with allies’ unwillingness to share intelligence that may be critical to NATO’s strategic efforts, makes it difficult to envision the center as an effective tool in implementing a coherent top-down cyber strategy in the near future.