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NATO is Divided over OCOs

Lonergan and Montgomery 1/25/22 (Dr. Erica Lonergan (née Borghard) is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. She is also a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Erica previously served as a senior director on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, US Navy, is the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mark previously served as the executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. “PRESSING QUESTIONS: OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS AND NATO STRATEGY” https://mwi.usma.edu/pressing-questions-offensive-cyber-operations-and-nato-strategy/) //AB

Additionally, the reality is that several NATO members are already speaking publicly about offensive cyber operations below the level of warfare and their statements and actions have an effect on the entire alliance. In particular, NATO member nations have not reached a political consensus about the role of offensive cyber operations. In 2018, the US Department of Defense and US Cyber Command issued new  and policy  that articulated a role for the military in conducting offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict outside of US-controlled cyberspace (part of the “defend forward” strategy), and there has been some reporting about US offensive cyber operations. For instance, in  the United States disrupted the Russian-linked Internet Research Agency from interfering in the midterm elections. And, more recently, in  General Paul Nakasone, commander of US Cyber Command, publicly acknowledged that the military played a role in disrupting ransomware groups targeting critical infrastructure. The United States has also worked with other NATO allies, such as  and , to conduct “hunt forward” cyber operations on allied and partner networks to uncover and disrupt malicious cyber activity.

Other NATO allies have also been more transparent about offensive cyber operations. In 2020, the  announced a significant investment in its National Cyber Force, its organizational arm for offensive cyber operations, and its  emphasized the role of offensive cyber operations. In November 2021, General Nakasone and the director of Government Communications Headquarters—the UK government’s principal signals intelligence agency— jointly that the two governments were collaborating to “impose consequences” in cyberspace to disrupt adversary operations. The Netherlands has also publicly  to conducting offensive cyber operations.

Next Steps: Addressing Challenges and Mitigating Risks

Given the threat environment facing NATO, as well as the activities of several NATO members, the alliance should deliberately—but purposefully—consider incorporating offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict into its deterrence strategy. Any effort to explore a role for offensive cyber operations should also consider the challenges and risks that may come with doing so. A central challenge is that, at the political level, NATO allies lack consensus on the appropriate application of offensive cyber power—especially below the level of armed conflict. Addressing these disagreements among member states is essential because conducting offensive cyber operations often requires maneuvering through or operating on . Right now, NATO members do not collectively  on the  and processes for partner actions in allied networks—and they also disagree on how to define  in cyberspace, or when an offensive cyber operation would rise to the level of an armed attack.

Offensive cyber operations for NATO also present real interoperability challenges. The role of intelligence in cyber operations is likely to complicate NATO planning processes. Even close allies are likely to be wary about sharing sensitive intelligence for a number of reasons. For instance, they may be averse to sharing information gleaned from signals intelligence collection or because a member state may be using the same exploits for both offensive action and their own espionage—including intelligence collection against . Or, allies may simply be worried that sensitive information may become exposed. On top of this, it’s challenging to adjudicate intelligence requirements among allies and to deconflict intelligence and military priorities. It is also not clear whether the alliance has established consensus thresholds that specify the conditions and timeline under which a state would have to notify others of its activities on their networks—if at all.

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