Sweden and Finland are already capable of defeating Russia without NATO or other outside support
Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]
Within ten weeks, Finland’s eight decades-long equidistance, and Sweden’s two centuries long neutrality were jettisoned, in favor of unprecedented levels of military bloc formations and foreign military power support pledges, most notably from fellow Scandinavian nations: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and a post-Brexit Britain.5 Having rejected their historic neutrality, Finland and Sweden have now made formal applications to NATO membership. However, the new desire for NATO membership should not be construed as revealing a lack of current defenses or alertness towards the danger posed by Russia.
The existing force postures of Finland and Sweden are uniquely designed to deter Russia unilaterally. The Finnish force of 280,000 is augmented by around 900,000 reservists who are trained for wartime.6 Finland never abolished conscription, so the Finnish population is functionally ready for wartime service at a moment’s notice. Finnish “Comprehensive Security” stresses training to balance Russian hybrid warfare, with intelligence exchange, interoperability, and training with Western forces.7 Finnish strategy of insurgency as a deterrence tactic to blunt massive occupation forces is designed with Russia in mind. Finnish defence spending is roughly 2% of GDP and certain to increase.8 Finland is thus well positioned to blunt and deter any Russian invasion on its own and is almost certain to have major western support in arms and resources in case of a war, even without NATO membership, as Ukraine has enjoyed.
Sweden saw major cuts in defense spending and manpower in the immediate post-Cold War era similar to other major powers, but brought back conscription in 2017, after some deliberation following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.9 Sweden boasted of mass conscription during the Cold War and had one of the largest trained militaries, which were downsized as the Soviet threat receded. Sweden is also fortunate to have the Baltic states and Finland as buffer states from a direct Russian land invasion. In recent days however, Sweden increased its draft by 4,000 soldiers per year and reinstated a garrison on a dormant but strategic island base in Visby, Gotland. Overall, both Sweden and Finland have been and arguably are capable of deterring a Russian push for conquest.10
The Case Against NATO Expansion:
In a recent open survey of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy experts, a question was posed about whether Finnish and Swedish memberships are useful for NATO. The answers ranged from “no doubt,” to “certainly,” and “definitely,” to “straight yes” and “enormously so,” before reaching the broad consensus that the accession of Finland and Sweden would “strengthen the alliance’s defenses and greatly increase security in the Baltic region.” There was not a single voice of dissent.11 While this might be exemplary of a typical selection bias in such quarters, and design flaw in open question surveys, the Atlanticist foreign policy community has been overwhelmingly supportive of adding further commitments and members in the alliance. This is symptomatic of the long generational and ideological shift in foreign policy thinking in Washington, from serious scholarly opposition to NATO’s first round of expansion during the Clinton administration, to an overwhelming support in recent days.12
Support for Finnish and Swedish membership can be categorized into three broad arguments.13 First, that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unleashed an intense “security dilemma” and the smaller states who now feel threatened should be immediately added as protectorates and the western (primarily American) nuclear umbrella extended. Second, Sweden and Finland are already de facto part of the Western alliance, through either regional cooperative frameworks such as the Nordic Defense Cooperation and Joint Expeditionary Force, or collaborations within the EU framework and partnerships with NATO. Third, Sweden and Finland already have strong militaries and countries with democratic foundations, and both bring unique deterrence capabilities and strengthen NATO’s northern flank which will make NATO stronger. These arguments are contradictory, often paradoxical, and strategically flawed.
The first line of argument – that the Russian threat has morphed to now require NATO protection – is predicated on Sweden and Finland’s threat perceptions. While Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine is clear, the fundamental security dynamic has not changed. At the time of this brief, Russia is suffering from enormous and potentially unbridgeable battlefield setbacks. The Russian dash to Kiev failed, and Moscow is seemingly unable to compensate battlefield attrition, including an overwhelming number of officer class attrition, unthinkable for any other top-tier military and unseen in any other recent conflicts. The Russian battlegroups are not in full operational strength. Russia is unable to fill the gaps created by casualties, troop morale is low, and around a fifth of Russian invasion force hardware have been destroyed. In short, Russia is in no position to continue a “war of conquest,” much less a war of occupation or attrition, without declaring a “total war” that requires vast levels of domestic conscription, which is of course, politically unpopular and potentially volatile for Vladimir Putin. While there have been some indications of a willingness to broaden the Russian military base, it is certainly not in the interests of Western policymakers to incentivize such a development. The much-vaunted Russian military reforms quite clearly did not materialize. The Russian-backed air war over Syria was dependent on Syrian regime troops as cannon fodder, and is materially different and far less costly than a multi-spectrum state-vs-state war of conquest in Ukraine. Russia isn’t capable of the latter.
Despite her historic aspirations, Russia enormously overestimated her own power in Ukraine. Instead, the Russian experience in Ukraine, while a humanitarian catastrophe, has demonstrated long term hardware, personnel, intelligence and training deficiencies, as well as structural issues including endemic corruption, old school planning, authoritarian decision-making echochamber, and low troop morale.14 Russia also lacks the economic base and material power and is increasingly reeling under sanctions.15 Put simply, Russia is not going to be the hegemonic spectre looming over Europe anytime in the near future. What logically entails, is that the Ukraine invasion is not the first domino to fall across Europe, meriting a preoccupation with Russian encroachment, but rather, Russia is a manageable threat that European states can increasingly balance on their own collectively. Europeans are perfectly capable without further investment of American treasure or promise of American blood, and a primacist grand-strategy requiring American forward presence.16 The only reason Europe is taking a backseat is because they are reliant on the unending generosity of Americans.17 In addition, a much-weakened Russia can also be extremely volatile, prone to miscalculation and paranoia, which might be exacerbated by the “chain-ganging” of Western great powers by their activist junior allies–a very common and observable dynamic especially seen under the conditions of multipolarity wherein smaller protectorates and hectoring and sanctimonious allies attempt to drag much larger benefactors to a great power war. It is a trap the US must judiciously avoid at all cost. Otherwise the result could well be greater misunderstanding and an even greater risk of accidental conflict along a much longer border with NATO. This paradoxical dynamic isn’t new in international relations, the First World War being the most ruinous example.18
The only development that might reverse an emerging natural equilibrium, is a Ukrainian counterattack on Crimea or somewhere deep inside Russian territory, or a major expansion of an alliance which justifies Russia’s historic and entrenched paranoia, such as a renewed push for further NATO enlargement. A Ukrainian counterattack might result in Russia pulling the nuclear card. It might also solicit a “rally around the flag” effect for this otherwise unpopular and deteriorating war. Barring those, Russian aspiration to be a major revanchist great power in the European balance is practically over, and Russia’s current near total international isolation in 2022 is comparable to her isolation in 1856 or 1921. Meanwhile Ukraine has managed with conscription and compulsory male draft to gather an overwhelming number of men willing to defend their country, and is well supplied with practically unlimited foreign resources and weaponry, an example to other states in the region.
In that light, the idea that Finland and Sweden, with significant military capabilities of their own, need to be in an alliance for protection against Russian revanchism at a time when Russia’s status as a revanchist great power is itself in question, is fallacious, especially with Russia facing a quagmire in Ukraine. The possibility of a Russian invasion and conquest of Finland or Sweden is nearly non-existent.19
Likewise, it is also paradoxical to argue that Finland and Sweden need protection, while simultaneously contending that they are uniquely powerful militaries with deterrence capabilities needed for strengthening NATO’s northern frontier.20 The capabilities that Sweden and Finland has, including a top-tier airforce, are formidable, but not novel to NATO. Addition of another approximately two hundred jets will not significantly alter the combined air power of NATO, which is already superior to Russia. Sweden and Finland will not bring any new capabilities that would drastically alter the balance of power in the region, and other than intelligence sharing, would not add any material advantage to an already overwhelmingly superior NATO. Given that Swedish and Finnish conscription forces and reservists only come into play during a war, and the chance of a war with Russia is negligible, they are also not adding any significant manpower to NATO. NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” from Poland and the Baltic states, can already cover and protect the allies in the region, as well as project power in the Arctic without the need for any new bases in Sweden or Finland. According to NATO’s website, the force projection includes eight multinational “battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively, [which] are robust and combat-ready forces,” and a “multinational brigade, under Multinational Division Southeast in Romania” for improved situational awareness and enhanced readiness.21 The Baltics and the Arctic are challenging frontiers to defend, and some of the older arguments against NATO enlargement touched upon it. Russia is considered to have an escalation dominance in the region, due to sheer manpower it can muster in a full spectrum war. However, recent Russian experience in Ukraine, and the negligible chance of a full spectrum war should ease some of the concerns about mindless Russian imperial revanchism. According to a Rand Corp analysis, even though the Baltics are hard to defend in case of an actual war, deterring Russia is relatively easy with a few divisions of forward positioned troops, with the implied threat that any casualty would trigger a NATO – Russia war. Newer bases in Finland and Sweden are unnecessary in that regard for any extended deterrence in the region.22