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A US commitment to cooperation on standards for AI TEVV is a confidence building measure that reduces the risk of inadvertent conflicts and builds international support for safety

Horowitz and Kahn, 2021 – Senior and Research Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Lauren, The Washington Quarterly 3-19-2021 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018794 acc on 6-21-2022 TM]

Reducing Risks through Confidence-Building Measures Confidence-building measures could prove promising to reduce these risks of accidents, unintentional conflict, and inadvertent escalation associated with military applications of AI. The United Nations defines CBMs as “planned procedures to prevent hostilities, to avert escalation, to reduce military tension, and to build trust between countries.”16 In their simplest form, they are cross-national plans and procedures put in place to handle certain military and crisis events. Formal CBMs emerged from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the third meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), due to shared need and interest in preventing nuclear war.17 CBMs were specifically designed for European states’ “exchange of information, notification, and observation of major military activities,” with the aim of decreasing the risk of accidental war during the Cold War.18 Historically, CBMs work best when states fear that a lack of information could increase pressure to escalate: some mechanisms exist to mitigate lack of information; states have sufficient control over their militaries to ensure procedures are adhered to and orders are followed; and finally, when adversaries share at least some interests such as preventing accidental war. In the case of shared interests, going back to Thomas Schelling on Cold War strategic competition, cooperation between potential adversaries becomes more plausible when both sides can benefit and are incentivized to pursue the same end goal.19 We now describe four different CBMs that are applicable to the military AI arena: standardization, dialogues on AI safety, a statement on positive human control over nuclear weapons, and an autonomous incidents agreement. All focus specifically on issues surrounding accidents and miscalculation—areas where countries have shared interests in ensuring that military applications of AI do not lead to unintended conflict or escalation of tensions. Standard-Setting for Military AI, Including AI Safety Shared standards for safe uses of military AI could reduce the probability of accidents. Standards help to “herald market access, interoperability, and connectivity,” and while they might appear to be technical, standards can permit the “baking-in” of fundamental human rights protections when “ethical AI principles are translated into technical standards.”20 Furthermore, in the long run, standardization will facilitate coordination between states and ease interoperability with allied systems as well. Therefore, standard-setting for AI should start with something the United States is already committed to—following international humanitarian law. For example, including a commitment to strong TEVV requirements for AI enabled systems could further help create norms of responsible behavior surrounding the development of military uses of AI, or setting parameters on training data that can help reduce issues of bias.21 A critical element of standard setting could be commitments to follow expert-designed standards on AI safety in the TEVV process for military applications of AI.22 Key principles could include a testing framework that specifies error rates relative to existing systems, continual testing—even after deployment—rather than one-shot testing, testbeds to provide more realistic testing environments, and fail-safes built into systems in case something goes wrong. For the United States, standard-setting to enhance AI safety will only succeed if the United States does not share information that could directly help potential US adversaries. Sharing details about how the United States does TEVV, or how it is planning on doing TEVV for AI-enabled systems, could provide potential adversaries with information they would use to make their AI-enabled systems more effective. Thus, standard-setting and dialogue in these areas should focus more on themes and best practices rather than on policy details. A final element of common standards could be an emphasis on familiarizing operators with the limits of algorithms, an approach designed to reduce the potential for automation bias and even, on the other hand, automation aversion.23 An informal multilateral agreement could be proposed and opened for signature to all nations. If the United States leads, American allies and partners would be likely to sign on, both due to the impact of American leadership in shaping attitudes and the likely perception that following US-led principles would facilitate defense cooperation in this area.

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