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AI is different from other Arms Races – it is not exclusively military, which means there is less advantage to moving first

Horowitz, 2018 – Professor of Political Science at UPenn [Michael, September “The Algorithms of August: The AI arms race won't be like previous competitions, and both the United States and China could be left in the dust,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/will-the-united-states-lose-the-artificial-intelligence-arms-race/ 6/18/22 MD]

AN  ARMS RACE IS COMING. It is Unlikely to play out in the way that the mainstream media suggest, however: as a faceoff between the United States and China. That's because AI differs from the technologies, such as nuclear and battleships, that have been the subject of arms races in the past. After all, AI is software--not hardware. Because AI is a general purpose --more like the combustion engine or electricity than a weapon--the competition to develop it will be broad, and the line between its civilian and military uses will be blurry. There will not be one exclusively military AI arms race. There will instead be many AI arms races, as countries (and, sometimes, violent nonstate actors) develop new algorithms or apply private sector algorithms to help them accomplish particular tasks. In North America, the private sector invested some $15 billion to $23 billion in AI in 2016, according to a McKinsey Global Institute report. That's more than 10 times what the U.S. government spent on unclassified AI programs that same year. The largest share came from companies such as Google and Microsoft, as well as a number of smaller private firms, not from government-funded defense research. This reverses the dynamic from the Cold , when government investments led to private sector innovation and produced technologies such as GPS and the internet. China says it already holds more than 20 percent of patents in the field and plans to build its AI sector to be worth $150 billion by 2030. But while Beijing and Washington are the current leaders in this race, they are not the only competitors. Countries around the world with advanced technology sectors, from Canada to France to Singapore, also have the potential to make great strides in AI (or build on lower-level advances made by others). While this diffusion means that many more countries will have a stake in the regulation of AI, it also means that many more governments will have incentives to go it on their own. UNLIKE THE DEVELOPMENT of a Stealth bomber, which has only military applications, basic AI research has both military and civilian uses, which makes it much harder to keep research secret and thereby sustain a large first-mover advantage. The dual-use character of many developments in AI creates an incentive to promote their release and spread to the general public. That means companies can co-opt advances made by market leaders--especially lower-level advances that do not require significant computing hardware.

Autonomous weapons won’t cause an Arms Race – just because countries develop them doesn’t mean that they are in a hostile race.

Horowitz, 2019 - Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania [Michael C. May 2“When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability” https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348356]

Arms Races or Proliferation? It is important to distinguish arms races from the proliferation of military technologies. The scientists in the example above compared an LAWS arms race to the spread of Kalashnikovs, but there was never an arms race in Kalashnikovs – they just spread rapidly because they were cheap, easy to produce, and useful.39 Huntington’s classic work on arms races distinguishes between proliferation and arms races. Countries can increase their arms acquisitions due to an “absolute need” that exists “regardless of the actions of other states”, or for economic reasons.40 Huntington argues that many things described as arms races are simply general buildups due to military necessity (or for economic reasons), rather than a specific buildup due to a particular disagreement between states.41 For example, after their debut in World War I, countries around the world acquired tanks in the 1920s and 1930s. Tanks then became a critical part of ground warfare in World War II and subsequent conventional ground combat operations. Yet few would call the spread of tanks in the 1920s and 1930s an arms race. It was simply proliferation that was not possible to stop, as large-caliber guns, caterpillar tracks, and the combustion engine were available to countries around the world.42 To the extent that those concerned about an arms race in autonomous weapon technologies are actually concerned with proliferation, some degree of proliferation may be inevitable simply due to the underlying factors involved in the production of LAWS. As Horowitz argues, military capabilities diffuse faster when, on the technology acquisition side, there is underlying commercial demand and the unit costs are low.43 Commercial markets are already driving the integration of artificial intelligence into several areas of the US and global economies, through deep learning and machine learning applications.44 From Google search to Macy’s shopping assistance for customers, artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in commercial sectors of modern society.45 Narrow applications of AI could become increasingly integrated into most economic sectors, with many algorithms, once developed, now available to many actors.46 Export controls are unlikely to stop basic narrow AI capabilities from spreading, even if more advanced applications are beyond the capacity of most companies and governments; government regulations generally lag emerging technologies. Finally, AI innovation is occurring around the world, not just in the United States or even the West. Machine learning capabilities designed for commercial purposes could also have spillovers with useful applications to the military realm. This would reverse the Cold War dynamic in the West, where US civilian economic innovations such as GPS often spun out of military development programs.47 Artificial intelligence, as described above, is more an enabler such as the combustion engine than a weapon. It is therefore different than a platform like stealth technology, which really only has military purposes.

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