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NATO is key to AI cyber safety – they must establish norms on testing and verifying cyber AI weapons – the EU is not good enough

Taddeo and Floridi, 2018 - Senior research fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute and Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of Information at the University of Oxford [Mariarosaria, Luciano, Nature.com, “Regulate artificial intelligence to avert cyber arms race,” https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04602-6 6/18/22 MD]

The EU is stepping-up too. In 2017, it reassessed cyber security and defence policies and launched the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. EU directives present the most comprehensive regulatory framework for state conduct in cyberspace to date. Yet they do not go far enough. The EU treats cyber defence as a case of cyber security, to be improved passively by making member states’ information systems more resilient. It disregards active uses of cyber defence and does not include AI. This is a missed opportunity. The EU could have begun defining ‘red lines’ and proportionate responses. For example, the EU Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems [10] provides criteria for identifying critical national infrastructures, such as health systems or key energy and water supplies that should be protected. The same criteria could be used to define illegitimate targets of state-sponsored cyber-attacks. Regional forums, like NATO and the EU, must take the following three steps to avoid serious imminent attacks on state infrastructures and to maintain international stability. Three steps Define legal boundaries. The international community needs to agree urgently upon ‘red lines’ distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate targets and definitions of proportionate responses for cyber defence strategies. International consensus at the UN level will ultimately be required. Until then guidelines from regional multilateral bodies, like NATO and the EU, must cover these issues and lead by example. Test strategies with allies. ‘Sparring’ exercises should be organised between friendly countries to test AI-based defence tactics. These tests should be mandatory before any system is deployed. They could be in the form of DARPA’s Grand Challenge or the cyber simulation exercises routinely run by NATO and the EU. Because AI learns by experience, these matches will improve the strategies of the alliance, while finding and healing weaknesses. Fatal vulnerabilities of key systems and crucial infrastructures should be shared with allies; policy frameworks should demand disclosure. Agreements and regulations with similar sharing and disclosure requirements include the EU eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services) Regulation and the IPA (Industry Partnership Agreement) within NATO. Monitor and enforce rules. The international community needs to agree on how to audit and oversee AI-based state cyber defence operations. Alert and remedy mechanisms are needed to address 5 mistakes and unintended consequences. A third-party authority with teeth, such as the UN Security Council, should rule on whether red lines, proportionality, responsible deployment or disclosure norms have been breached. As in the case with other international norms, economic or political sanctions should be imposed on states violating rules. NATO and the EU should enforce the norms within their remits.

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