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The DOD definition of autonomous weapons is the best – it focuses on functionality, best reflects the concerns about AI, and gives urgency to the debate.

Amoroso and Tamburrini, 2021 - Prof of International Law at the University of Cagliari and Prof of Philosophy of Science and Technology at the University of Naples Federico [Daniele and Guglielmo, Feb Italian Journal of International Affairs “In Search of the ‘Human Element’: International Debates on Regulating Autonomous Weapons Systems” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1864995 TM]

Despite heated diplomatic debates, agreement is still lacking among states about what an AWS is. Nevertheless, discussion about this fundamental issue is not fragmented into a myriad of competing notions of ‘autonomy’. Rather, it is polarised around two basic construals, epitomised by those advanced by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the US Department of Defense (DoD). The UK MoD sets a very demanding requirement for a weapons system to be autonomous. Indeed, the MoD’s Joint Doctrine Publications devoted to Unmanned Aircraft Systems describe AWS as systems “capable of understanding higher level intent and direction”, thereby being able “to take appropriate action to bring about the desired state” (UK MoD 2011, 14; 2017, 13). This is a tall order. Neither existing nor foreseeable weapons systems genuinely comprehend the meaning of higher-level goals and intentions. And there are presently no educated guesses as to the prospects for their development. Thus, weapons systems that are genuinely autonomous according to the UK MoD are projected into an undetermined technological future. If one endorses this approach, then ethical and legal discussions about AWS are simply premature in that they concern neither present nor foreseeable technological developments. This conclusion, however, conflicts with the intuitions underlying current academic and diplomatic debates, according to which normative analysis and deliberation on AWS are an urgent issue (Amoroso and Tamburrini 2017, 3-4). Remarkably absent in the US DoD Directive on ‘Autonomy in Weapons System’ is any attempt to account for autonomy in terms of high-level intent comprehension. Instead, this Directive introduces a functional, task-oriented condition for weapons systems to be considered autonomous: a weapon system must be able, after activation, to “select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator” (US DoD 2012). It is of the utmost relevance for the international debate that the US DoD requirement on autonomy was embraced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 2016, 1) and the Campaign (Campaign 2013, 1). Therefore, the chief stakeholders – the technologically most advanced military power, the main guardian of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the coalition of NGOs advocating a ban on AWS – converged on this formulation of necessary properties of autonomy.2 Such an international convergence is a good reason to endorse the DoD’s functional condition of autonomy as a starting point for AWS legal and ethical debates. There is, however, another reason for preferring the DoD over the UK MoD’s approach: it supports the intuition that normative analysis and deliberation about AWS is an urgent and impending issue since a variety of existing and technologically foreseeable systems satisfy the DoD functional condition.

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