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International cyber agreements always fail – history proves

MaČÁK 17 [Kubo MaČÁK, Dr Kubo Mačák is a legal adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Prior to joining the ICRC in 2019, he worked as an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. "From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers," Cambridge University press, https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/from-cyber-norms-to-cyber-rules-reengaging-states-as-lawmakers/63A45029B685C11BBD9512AC0459FAE5] Blitz

2. Crisis indicators: International law and cyber security Three stand-out indicators suggest a crisis in this area of law. First, the domain of cyber security appears resistant to codification of the applicable rules in a comprehensive multilateral binding treaty.This is not for want of trying by the leading international stakeholders. In 1996, France put forward the earliest proposal with the lofty title Charter for International Cooperation on the Internet.Later, a Sino-Russian initiative resulted in two proposals for a Code of Conduct for Information Security, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2011 and 2015, respectively.However, none of these proposals was met with much enthusiasm by other statesand scholars describe the prospects of an ‘omnibus’ treaty being adopted in the near future as slim to negligible.This is no doubt partly because, whatever the subject, the ‘very word “treaty” may conjure up the fearsome formalities of diplomacy’, with a chilling effect on states’ willingness to engage in this form of law-making.Yet, with respect to cyber security, this aversion appears to be particularly pronounced. Second, states have shown extreme reluctance to contribute to the development of cyber-specific customary international rules. In addition to state practice in this area being inevitably shrouded in secrecy,states have been reluctant to offer clear expressions of opinio juris on matters related to cyber security.At times, this approach may be understandable, as it is the consequence of domestic political gridlock or a deliberate waiting strategy.On other occasions, it may rather be due to the persistent ‘cybersecurity knowledge gap’; in other words, the striking lack of understanding of cybersecurity permeating governments around the world.On the whole, this reluctance adds to the pervasive ambiguity as far as the specific applicability of international law is concerned. This trend is visible even in the most recent developments. A representative example of another missed opportunity to steer the development of cyber custom is provided by the recent US Law of War Manual adopted in July 2015 and updated in December 2016.Although it does contain a chapter on cyber operations,the Manual skirts virtually all unsettled issues, including standards of attribution, rules of targeting or the requirement to review cyber weapons.

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