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Turkey will still block Sweden and Finland --- disagreement over PKK issue

Alaaldin, 22 – Nonresident Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (Ranj, 2022"Turkey’s threat to derail Swedish and Finnish NATO accession reraises the Kurdish question," Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/03/turkeys-threat-to-derail-swedish-and-finnish-nato-accession-reraises-the-kurdish-question/;DOA: 6-21-2022) SMTX//BSA

Turkey’s opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine has elevated the Kurdish question on the international stage. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to capitalize on the urgency of fortifying Western deterrence by increasing the pressure on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The insurgent group has fought the Turkish state for five decades to secure greater rights for Turkey’s Kurds but enjoyed a rapid ascension with the onset of the Syrian civil war and Washington’s 2014 decision to partner with its sister organization to defeat the Islamic State group (IS).

The PKK has constituted a major component of Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the United States for decades, and Erdoğan has initiated several military campaigns into Syria’s northeast to suppress the autonomous enclave the PKK’s sister organization, the Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), formed in the midst of the civil war. While Turkey may be using the Nordic NATO accession talks to receive Western backing for another campaign, it has a long record of carrying out cross-border incursions against the PKK and Erdoğan may also be trying to secure other concessions, including the lifting of embargoes on Turkey’s defense industry.

But Ankara’s opposition to Swedish and Finnish accession, based on their refusal to extradite PKK members, as well as followers of the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen (whom Ankara accuses of instigating a 2016 coup attempt), highlights that the Kurdish question cannot be decoupled from Western security interests. The tectonic shifts that have taken place in the global security order since Russia invaded Ukraine means that the second-order effects of the war against IS and the proximity of the Kurdish question to U.S. and European security interests requires a reprioritization of the issue in the West.

Turkey’s conflict with the PKK has long complicated Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and its European allies. Relations have been in flux and either enhanced or upended by shifting fault lines in the Middle East since the 2011 Arab uprisings and the emergence of IS. Although the 2013 peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK raised hopes of a lasting settlement, the fragile truce was upended in 2015 by the YPG’s ascension in Syria, its refusal to prioritize the fall of the Assad regime, and deep-seated animosities. The result was a renewal of a domestic conflict that has taken on multiple transnational dimensions and produced untold humanitarian crises.

Ankara has for decades questioned Europe’s commitment to addressing its security concerns. In the 1990s, Greece and Italy provided refuge to the PKK’s imprisoned founder and leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the PKK established an expansive infrastructure, including in Sweden, that allows it to mobilize supporters and resources in Europe and in Turkey. European leaders had hoped to leverage Turkey’s EU accession process to improve Turkey’s human rights records but talks stagnated more than a decade ago and both sides have effectively given up on it.

Similarly, in addition to supporting the YPG, the U.S. has provoked Erdoğan’s ire by refusing to extradite the Pennsylvania-based Gülen, while Washington also imposed tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium after an agreement to release pastor Andrew Brunson fell through in 2018. Ankara did U.S.-Turkey relations no favours by purchasing Russian air defense systems, after which Washington imposed sanctions on Turkey.

Turkey’s relations with the West will continue to be crisis-driven amid a range of ongoing tensions, including over the conflict in Libya, the eastern Mediterranean crisis, tensions with the EU over the future of 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, and NATO expansion in response to Russia’s aggression. Putting Turkish responsibility for the current state of affairs to one side, the trans-Atlantic alliance is guilty of failing to establish forward-looking approaches to tumult in Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighborhood, opting instead for incoherent and reactive engagement that has put issues like the PKK conflict and broader Kurdish political questions on the back burner.

The failure to mitigate the second-order effects of policies designed to address security threats like IS has allowed Ankara to exploit the West’s failure to balance the imperative of securing the defeat of the jihadis with the need to manage the security interests of regional actors like Turkey. This has had serious strategic implications, as evidenced by the current dispute over NATO membership and the pressure NATO has faced as a result of the ebb in relations and disputes over the YPG’s dominance in Syria.

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