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Text – The United States should enter into an Autonomous Incidents Agreement with the People's Republic of China.

An Autonomous Incidents Agreement minimizes unintended escalation – precedent shows rules of the road can avoid military accidents

Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and  Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]

There are inherent risks when autonomous systems with any level of decision-making interact with adversary forces in contested areas. Given the brittleness of algorithms, the deployment of autonomous systems in a crisis situation could increase the risk of accidents and miscalculation. AI-related CBMs could build on Cold War agreements to reduce the risk of accidental escalation, with some modification to account for the new challenges AI-enabled autonomous systems present. States have long used established “rules of the road” to govern the interaction of military forces operating with a high degree of autonomy, such as at naval vessels at sea, and there may be similar value in such a CBM for interactions with AI-enabled autonomous systems. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and older “rules of the road” such as maritime prize law provide useful historical examples for how nations have managed analogous challenges in the past. Building on these historical examples, states could adopt a modern-day “international autonomous incidents agreement” that focuses on military applications of autonomous systems, especially in the air and maritime environments. Such an agreement could help reduce risks from accidental escalation by autonomous systems, as well as reduce ambiguity about the extent of human intention behind the behavior of autonomous systems. In addition to the Incidents at Sea Agreement, maritime prize law is another useful historical analogy for how states might craft a rule set for autonomous systems’ interactions. Prize law, which first began in the 12th century and evolved more fully among European states in the 15th to 19th centuries, regulated how ships interacted during wartime. Because both warships and privateers, as a practical matter, operated with a high degree of autonomy while at sea, prize law consisted of a set of rules governing acceptable wartime behavior. Rules covered which ships could be attacked, ships’ markings for identification, the use of force, seizure of cargo, and providing for the safety of ships’ crews. Nations face an analogous challenge with autonomous systems as they become increasingly integrated into military forces. Autonomous systems will be operating on their own for some period of time, potentially interacting with assets from other nations, including competitors, and there could be value in establishing internationally agreed upon “rules of the road” for how such systems should interact. The goal of such an agreement, which would not have to be as formal as the Incidents at Sea Agreement, would be to increase predictability and reduce ambiguity about the behavior of autonomous systems. Such an agreement could be legally binding but would not necessarily need to be in order to be useful. It would likely need to be codified in an agreement (or set of agreements), however, so that expectations are clear by all parties. An ideal set of rules would be self-enforcing, such that it is against one’s own interests to violate them. Examples of rules of this kind in warfare include prohibitions against perfidy and giving “no quarter,” violating either of which incentivizes the enemy to engage in counterproductive behavior, such as refusing to recognize surrender or fighting to the bitter end rather than surrendering. An autonomous incidents agreement could also include provisions for information-sharing about potential deployments of autonomous systems in disputed areas and mechanisms for consultation at the military-to-military level to resolve questions that arise (including potentially a hotline to respond to incidents in real time).

An Autonomous Incidents Agreement solves escalation by monitoring compliance – China will be willing to cooperate.

Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and  Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]

One benefit to an international rule set that governs the behavior of autonomous systems, particularly in peacetime or pre-conflict settings, is that the outward behavior of the system would be observable, even if its code is not. Other nations could see how another country’s autonomous air, ground, or maritime drone behaves and whether it is complying with the rules, depending on how the rules are written. One benefit to an international rule set that governs the behavior of autonomous systems, particularly in peacetime or pre-conflict settings, is that the outward behavior of the system would be observable, even if its code is not. Given the perceived success of the Incidents at Sea Agreement in decreasing the risk of accidental and inadvertent escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union, an equivalent agreement in the AI space might have potential to do the same for a new generation. The efficacy of any agreement would depend on the details, both in the agreement itself and in states’ execution. For example, the United States and China have signed multiple CBM agreements involving air and maritime deconfliction of military forces, including the 1998 U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, yet U.S.-China air and naval incidents have continued. However, the existence of these prior agreements themselves may be a positive sign about the potential for U.S.-China cooperation on preventing accidents and could be a building block for further collaboration. Moreover, in a February 2020 article, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advocated for CBMs between the United States and China, including on military AI, drawing on the example of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. Interest in at least some quarters in the Chinese military suggests that cooperation may be possible even in the midst of competition, especially if the PLA is willing to reciprocate American transparency.

Military to military dialogue with China prevents the worst AI accidents from escalating

Horowitz and Kahn, 2021 – Senior and Research Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Lauren, The Washington Quarterly 3-19-2021 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TM]

Dialogue on AI Safety and Strategic Stability One type of CBM the United States could promote is dialogues, including scientific dialogues, Track-II dialogues, and military-to-military dialogues on issues surrounding military uses of AI, including strategic stability. Many Track-II dialogues are already underway between US and Chinese as well asUS and Russian participants.25 The Biden administration and Russian President Putin have already committed to an integrated Strategic Stability Dialogue designed to encompass all potential factors that could impact strategic stability, including emerging technologies.26 More dialogue with China on AI could also benefit the United States. In both cases, explaining how seriously the United States takes AI safety and its commitment to using AI in ways that enhance strategic stability could persuade some Chinese and Russian counterparts to take those issues more seriously themselves. At worst, making the case for a sensible, and safe, approach to military uses of AI will make the United States look more reasonable globally if China and Russia do not agree, given the way the content of these discussions almost inevitably becomes a part of global conversations. In that way, even if Chinese and Russian counterparts do not substantively engage, the attempt will still signal American prioritization of AI safety and enhance global US scientific credibility.

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