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Human control can be made meaningful – standards have been established that allow coherent discussions on Human Control

Amoroso and Tamburrini, 2021 - Prof of International Law at the University of Cagliari and Prof of Philosophy of Science and Technology at the University of Naples Federico [Daniele and Guglielmo, Feb Italian Journal of International Affairs “In Search of the ‘Human Element’: International Debates on Regulating Autonomous Weapons Systems” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1864995 TM]

How to make human control over weapons systems ‘meaningful’? The MHC formula made its appearance in AWS debates in a 2013 paper by Article36 commenting on the UK Ministry of Defence’s Joint Doctrine Note 2/2011 on unmanned systems. Taking issue with the paper’s interpretation of “human control”, which allowed weapons to carry out distinction and proportionality analyses without human intervention, Article36 made the case for retaining meaningful human control over individual attacks (Article36 2013, 2-4). In subsequent documents, it suggested that the notion of MHC has a twofold grounding: first, it is ethically and legally unacceptable to let machines apply (possibly lethal) force “without any human control whatsoever”; second, and more relevant here, not every form of human control is normatively satisfactory, since “a human simply pressing a ‘fire’ button in response to indications from a computer, without cognitive clarity or awareness, is not sufficient to be considered ‘human control’ in a substantive sense” (Roff and Moyes 2016, 1). At the GGE, Article36 elaborated on the idea of human control with three basic claims. First, the human control issue should be addressed in the early stages of design, with a view to ensuring predictability, reliability and transparency of relevant technologies. Second, users should be given adequate information regarding weapons systems’ functioning and their specific deployment contexts. Finally, “timely human action” should be required for the weapon to initiate an attack, as well as “a capacity for timely intervention” to stop the system if there are extended time lags (Moyes 2016, 2).

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