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It triggers tit-for-tat retaliation that escalates out of control

Jason Healy, 2019, (School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University), “The implications of persistent (and permanent) engagement in cyberspace” Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz008/5554878#140575448/ceng

The new strategy is a compelling assessment of cyber conflict as a state of constant contact and presents a strong case that reduced operational constraints enabling tactical friction to regain the initiative will nudge conflict back towards lower levels of aggression [9]. It is worth noting that forward defense is only one among several policies that can be termed active defense or indeed cyber deterrence: the administration of Donald Trump has continued and expanded a wide set of policy tools used by previous administrations, including sanctions and indictments [59]. It has also introduced new responses, most importantly coordinated international attribution of Russian [60] and North Korean [61] operations seen as particularly insulting to global norms and getting search warrants for computers outside of US territory in order to disrupt a North Korean botnet [62]. Still, it is no wonder that the US military has embraced an academic concept justifying its decade-long desire for reduced operational constraints and a more active posture to “take the fight to the enemy.” There remain major concerns. An overarching worry is that US Cyber Command does not appear to see this approach as fundamentally risky. The Vision asserts that the Command wants to be “not risk averse but risk aware” but it only highlights one procedural risk (an insufficient body of highly trained personnel) and one diplomatic risk (adversaries will falsely “seek to portray our strategy as ‘militarizing’ the cyberspace domain”). But those are the only risks the Command can imagine, or at least, is willing to publicly acknowledge. Indeed, because defending forward is framed as essential—“if the United States is to shape the development of international cyberspace norms, it can do so only through active cyber operations” [54], and “not a choice, but a structurally and strategically driven imperative” [57]—then the main risk is failing to adapt quickly and forcefully enough. To get to the promised land of milk and honey, superiority and stability, there is only one path: forward defense. It is technically determined that there is a single dominant strategy, one that is the best regardless of the strategies chosen by US adversaries. As in the Cold War, the military is again attempting to “pose starker alternatives and to couch them in terms of necessity rather than choice:” either remove constraints on the military or lose [63]. Imperatives are slippery things. Some are not imperatives at all, just a particularly unyielding perspective or preference presented as a dichotomy. How many US airmen died in World War Two because of the bomber-driven cult of the offensive? Other imperatives may be critical to tactical success but imperil the larger strategy, perhaps winning the battle but losing the war. The battlefield imperative to use overwhelming firepower can, for example, be fatal to a counterinsurgency strategy if it causes extensive collateral damage. Even seeming strategic imperatives can lead to catastrophic national security outcomes, as with Wilhelmine Germany’s pursuit of a grand fleet-in-being to challenge the British [64]. The dynamics here may be similar. A more thorough assessment of the risks must be rooted with the simplest one, the strategy might fail and intensify competition. Many assumptions, apparently unrecognized, underlie the belief that the USA can have both superiority and overmatch as well as stability. Yet, in a system as complex as the Internet, “we can never merely do one thing” [9, page 10].8 As Herb Lin and Max Smeets of Stanford University highlight, “neither ‘escalate’ or ‘escalation’ appear in the [Vision] document,” a significant omission which suggests US Cyber Command is downplaying, or not fully thinking through, the full dynamics of conflict [65]. A more engaged forward defense might result not in “negative” feedback—reducing conflict by bringing it back to the historical norm—but instead “positive” feedback, exacerbating the conflict and adversaries may see the new US vision as a challenge to rise to, rather than one from which to back away [9, chapter 4]. According to my colleague Robert Jervis, “a failure to anticipate positive feedback is one reason why consequences are often unintended,” [9, page 165] and sufficient positive feedback can push the system past a tipping point, at which the system resets itself into a new, and potentially far more dangerous, equilibrium. States have decided to keep their attacks below certain thresholds, but conflict and competition in cyberspace is only a few decades old. This may only be a phase, and an early one at that. As cyberspace becomes more existential for more states, the stakes continue to rise, elevating the risks along with them.

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