Prefer our evidence---the risks outweigh any potential benefit
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, 2016, (Jon and Erik; 8/25/2016; assistant professor of digital media and international affairs at the Univesrity of Toronto and PhD in political science form the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and wrote China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, professor of political science at the University of California San Diego and Director of cPASS; “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited,” http://deterrence.ucsd.edu/_files/LindsayGartzke_CoercionThroughCyberspace_DraftPublic1.pdf; Date Accessed: 7/10/2017/ceng
In contemporary defense policy discourse there are three influential narratives of mounting cyber peril, corresponding roughly to the three operational modes of attack, exploitation, and defense. The most dangerous scenarios envision the paralysis of industrial control systems or military command and control through surprise attack by anonymous hackers. The imagined aggressor may be a revisionist state like China or Iran or a non-state anarchist or terrorist empowered by the information revolution. A second narrative offers an alternative to the shock of sudden catastrophe, warning instead of the long term erosion of economic and military competitiveness drained away through persistent computer espionage. The relentless theft of vital secrets stored on corporate and government networks produces a “death by a thousand cuts” as states give their firms an unfair commercial advantage and equip their military forces with potent countermeasures to U.S. strengths. In both of these scenarios, commercial hacking tools and ubiquitous connectivity give weaker states and terrorists provide a potent means to exploit and attack the expanding attack surface of digitally-dependent advanced industrial states. A third threat narrative concerns the transformation of internet architecture to decisively benefit one political group at the expense of the other. At one extreme, the growth of flexible social media enables connected protesters to overwhelm and overthrow authoritarian regimes.15 At the other extreme, authoritarian governments censor internet content and reconfigure internet governance to undermine the internet’s potential for innovation and freedom. State paranoia about the threats of paralysis and erosion thus leads to digital lockout or “the end of the internet” as we know it.16 Threats of catastrophic attack, omniscient exploitation, and unassailable defense are myths because they imagine major rewards for little cost. The actual rewards of any given cyber campaign are rarely so great and the costs are rarely so trivial. Potential benefits of attack are discounted by uncertainty about the true value of the target to the adversary and the ability for the attacker to take advantage of it. Operative costs include the bureaucratic resources, development and testing requirements, human capital, and intelligence experience required to plan and run an effective covert cyber campaign. Setting aside the myths of low costs and high rewards (no free lunch), there are a variety of more realistic cyber operations with significant variation in their operative costs and benefits. A set of higher cost, and, potentially, higher reward complements enhance the capabilities of stronger actors who can master them. A much larger set of low cost, low reward irritants are available to weaker actors or even solitary individuals, but they provide only a small marginal return on a small investment.