Setting a standard for cyberattacks greenlights lower level attacks that escalate
Michael Horowitz, 10, (Michael Horowitz, Horowitz is an Assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has also held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, October 2010, “A Common Future? NATO and the Protection of the Commons”. Transatlantic Paper Series No. 3, https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/Trans-Atlantic_Papers_3-Horowitz.pdf, 6-26-2022) SCade
One option is to lay out a specific policy that would be a part of the Strategic Concept and that describes the sort of cyber attack that is damaging enough to trigger an Article 5 commitment from other NATO member states. The risk of such a specific declaration is that it could “green light” lower level attacks by guaranteeing that they would not trigger a NATO response. The advantage of a specific policy is that it sets up a clear red line for potential adversaries and potentially deters more dangerous types of cyber attacks. Bureaucratically, clear guidance about responding to cyber attacks could facilitate rapid responses in a crisis and prevent dangerous delays that place the security of member states at risk. While individual NATO member states are capable of acting quickly, NATO as an institution, like many institutions, works more slowly. Having preset procedures in place to govern the response to a cyber attack could help NATO members effectively coordinate in a crisis.