3 Human dignity
Scott J. Schweikart, Global Regulation of Germline Genome Editing: Ethical Considerations and Application of International Human Rights Law, 43 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 279 (2021). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol43/iss3/6
The larger question thus becomes: what constitutes “human dignity?” One answer is that human dignity is “respect derived automatically from one’s status as a human being.”75 Therefore, some scholars argue that alterations to the genome for “enhancement” purposes is a type of transhumanism that violates human dignity.76 Indeed, this line of thinking supports the declaration as an ethical tool that can be used to protect against violations of “human dignity” conducted via genetic alterations meant to enhance a human being.77 As some scholars argue, violations of human dignity via enhancement genome editing calls into question the personhood status of individuals with an altered genome, thus yielding profound implications on the rights and status of such individuals.78 This is particularly acute under a theory of “personhood” that emphasizes biology and genetics as determinative. Such a worldview that “implicitly assumes that the totality of human DNA is the source of a human essence” will invariably harm “the biological legacy” of children with germline modifications and risk “their entitlement to human rights and legal protections.”79 In other words, human rights protections may be in doubt because germline modified individuals could potentially be deemed as possessing a trans-altered personhood status, thus removing them from the normative status entitled to such protections.