Germline weapons could go undetected – making them even more dangerous
CROSS 18. (Ryan Cross covers the science and business of the biotech industry and drug discovery for the Boston Globe. He was previously a biotech reporter for Chemical & Engineering News where led coverage of COVID-19 vaccines. He has also written for MIT Technology Review and Science magazine. “Synthetic Biology Poses New Biosecurity Risks: Report from National Academies Categorizes a Dozen Scenarios from Highest to Lowest Concern.” C&EN Global Enterprise, vol. 96, no. 26, June 2018, p. 16. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1021/cen-09626-polcon1. Last Accessed: June 29, 2022, shARK).
The report, released last week by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, & Medicine, identifies a dozen ways that synthetic biology could be used to create biological weapons to harm humans. “Synthetic biology has the potential to enable new types of weapons,” says Michael J. Imperiale, a microbiologist at the University of Michigan Medical School and chair of the committee that authored the report. The committee identified three concerns of highest priority, including recreating pathogenic viruses such as Ebola, SARS, or smallpox. The second is engineering bacteria to make them more dangerous, which could be easily accomplished by inserting genes to confer antibiotic resistance. “Capabilities to do either of those have been around for a long time. They are only becoming more readily available,” Imperiale says. The third major concern is engineering microbes to produce and release toxic biochemicals. “The effects could resemble a chemical weapon or food poisoning,” says Patrick Boyle, head of design at Ginkgo Bioworks and an author of the new report. That scenario is particularly worrisome because it is unclear how long it would take scientists to detect that a maliciously engineered microbe was at play rather than a natural pathogen. “The report was extremely well done and delivered something that has potential to be useful for policy-makers,” because it prioritized potential threats, says Margaret E. Kosal, a chemist by training and currently a professor of international affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, who reviewed a draft of the report. “If everything is a problem, then nothing gets addressed,” she says. The report highlights one recently published scientific study outlining how to construct a horsepox virus, a relative of smallpox thought to be extinct in nature. Many biodefense experts, including Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University, have warned that synthetic biology tools could enable recreation of smallpox. “Safeguards against the misuse of those tools are weak and fragmented,” he says. Currently, some synthetic biology companies choose to run their own safeguards. Twist Bioscience uses computer programs to scan its DNA orders, and James Diggans, director of bioinformatics and biosecurity, says the company would have easily detected the horsepox DNA due to its similarity to smallpox. “That would have triggered internal review,” Diggans says. That virus is “not something we would be comfortable manufacturing,” he adds. Diggans, who also reviewed a draft of the report, applauds the “balanced treatment of the incredibly positive impact of synthetic biology and its risks.” However, he thinks that synthetic biology doesn’t actually make building biological weapons easier. Kosal concurs. “Making ineffective biological weapons is easy,” she says. “Making effective biological weapons is not easy.” —RYAN CROSS