Its ethical – germline editing isn’t contrary to dignity – modifying genomes happens in medical treatments and is consistent with international law.
Boggio and Yotova (2021). Gene editing of human embryos is not contrary to human rights law: A reply to Drabiak. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/bioe.12945
The second rebuttal concerns the argument that clinical interventions based on gene editing of human embryos are contrary to human dignity. The argument takes different forms: gene editing is seen as an alleged violation of human dignity because it (a) leads to considering some human lives (of those carrying good genes) better than others (of those carrying bad genes); (b) violates a purported right to genetic identity; and (c) compromises the human genome, whose unmodified form is allegedly a requisite of human dignity. Drabiak embraces the second and third forms of the argument. Taken to an extreme, the idea of this dignity being grounded on genetic identity or genetic inviolability leads to an indefensible conclusion: persons who have undergone cancer or other serious treatment, which modifies their genome, would have lost, or have suffered a violation of, their human dignity in the process. This conclusion is hard to defend on its face. More moderate accounts are not new to us and have been discussed in Yotova's background paper. After a thorough review of all international and regional instruments applicable to gene editing that mention human dignity, she concludes that “there is a trend of acknowledging that while embryos and foetuses are not generally recognised as holders of human rights, they are becoming increasingly recognised as having human dignity.” 46 The dignity‐ based argument is complex, and a lengthy analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper. Here we want to focus on some critical aspects. First, while embryos may possess human dignity, they are generally not recognized as rightsholders. As Yotova points out, “legally speaking … human rights are protected only after birth, which puts germline editing outside of their temporal scope of protection.” 47 This is the case under international law and also in the majority of domestic laws. The European Court of Human Rights also acknowledged the lack of consensus in Europe about the nature and status of the embryo, rejecting the argument that they are a “person” with “a right to life.” 48 Second, the ICESCR acknowledges human dignity. Nonetheless, it recognizes the right to access treatment to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and the right to access clinical applications as benefits of scientific progress compatible with human dignity. These two rights are recognized without reservations. As we have seen, their recognition is not absolute, leaving it up to State Parties to limit the two rights to access provided it is done according to the parameters set in Article 4 of the ICESCR. A State Party may consider the interest of embryos to deserve consideration that trumps the right to access clinical applications of gene editing of human embryos. However, this is a State Party's prerogative, not a duty under the Covenant. Third, the concept of human dignity was considered and discussed extensively during the negotiations of the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome but never as an argument against germline interventions. Instead, it was linked to very different legal principles.