Genetic engineering does not take away humanness
RUSSELL POWELL Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 2015 In Genes We Trust: Germline Engineering, Eugenics, and the Future of the Human Genome, USA Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):669-695 (2015) https://philpapers.org/rec/POWIGW
I will not take a stand here as to whether our given biological nature has intrinsic value or, if it does, how weighty that value might be. Indeed, there are serious problems with drawing any substantive bioethical conclusions from a conception of human nature (see Buchanan, 2009). Furthermore, authors will disagree over just how much of a departure from human biological nature is necessary to bring about the loss of intrinsic value associated with remaining “fundamentally human.” One might contend, for example, that much of human biological nature (as defined earlier) can be altered without altering fundamentally human characteristics. Attempting to distinguish putatively fundamental human characteristics from less fundamental ones raises a spate of philosophical difficulties that I will not address here. I will simply argue that if there is intrinsic value in retaining human biological nature or central features of “humanness,” then this gives us further reasons—conservative reasons—to actively promote human germline modification technologies, or at the very least to oppose prohibitions of germline intervention that are insensitive to risk-benefit analyses and which block the gathering of information necessary to make proper risk-benefit assessments.