Precautionary principle is pragmatically insufficient and results in self-interested ignorance and neglect of opportunity costs and risk probability comparisons
Sunstein 02 (The Paralyzing Principle BY CASS R. SUNSTEIN University of Chicago Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Chicago. Cato Institute Winter 2002-2003; http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2002/12/v25n4-9.pdf)
PRECAUTIONS AND RATIONALITY But if the Precautionary Principle, taken in a strong form, is unhelpful, how can we account for its extraordinary influence, and indeed for the widespread belief that it can and should guide regulatory judgments? Undoubtedly, self-interested political actors invoke the principle strategically. For example, European farmers invoke the idea of precaution to stifle American competitors who are far more likely to rely on genetically modified crops. But apart from that point, I suggest that an understanding of human cognition provides some useful clues: Loss aversion People dislike losses far more than they like corresponding gains. The result is that out-of-pocket costs, or deteriorations from the status quo, seem much worse than opportunity costs, or benefits lost as a result of continuing the status quo. In the context of risks, people often tend to focus on the losses that are associated with some activity or hazard, and to disregard the gains that might be associated with that activity or hazard. A closely related point is that unfamiliar risks produce far more concern than familiar ones, even if the latter are sta tistically larger; the Precautionary Principle, in practice, is much affected by that fact. The myth of a benevolent nature Loss aversion is often accompanied by a mistaken belief that nature is essentially benign, leading people to think that safety and health are generally at risk only or mostly as a result of human intervention. A belief in the relative safety of nature and the relative risk of new technologies often informs the Precautionary Principle. Because natural processes are often dangerous and human interventions often promote safety, a commitment to nature can be life threatening. The availability heuristic It is well known that people focus on some risks simply because they are cognitive y “available,” whereas other risks are not. When the Precautionary Principle seems to require stringent controls on one risk, even though other risks are in the vicinity, the availability heuristic is a common reason. And when the availability heuristic is at work, certain hazards will stand out whether or not they are not statistically large. The hazards associated with heat waves, for example, receive little public attention, while the hazards associated with air travel are a significant source of public concern; one reason is that the latter hazards come readily to mind. That is a serious problem because the less salient risks, including those from heat waves and poor diet, can be the serious ones. Probability neglect People are sometimes prone to neglect the probability that a bad outcome will occur; they focus instead on the outcome itself. The Precautionary Principle often embodies a form of probability neglect. At least, that is the case when people invoke the principle to favor stringent controls on a low-probability risk and when the consequence of those very controls is to give rise to new risks of equal or greater probability. In the context of the sniper attacks in the Washington, D.C. area in October 2002, people were far more concerned, and took many more precautions, than the statistical realities warranted, in part because the high salience of the attacks led to a form of probability neglect. It is highly likely that some of those precautions, including those that involved extra driving, actually increased people’s risks. System neglect The Precautionary Principle often reflects a general neglect of the systemic effects of regulation. When a single problem is placed in view, it can be difficult to see the full consequences of legal interventions. Sometimes, the principle has the appearance of being workable only because a subset of the relevant effects is “on screen” — and hence there seems to be no need to take precautions against other possible adverse effects that do not register. I suggest that the Precautionary Principle seems appealing to many people in large part for the same reason.