No solvency - exposing disability oppression does not lead to change in perception or attitude
Donoghue 2003 (Christopher, Fordham University, Challenging the authority of the medical definition of disability: an analysis of the resistance to the social constructionist paradigm, Disability & Society 18.2)
In an effort to debunk the entrenched authority of the medical model, a social constructionist paradigm has been adopted by many disability theorists and activists. They have suggested that society normally creates a negative social identity for people with disabilities (Gergen, 1985; Fine & Asch, 1988; Scotch, 1988; Brzuzy, 1997). Through the construction of this identity, which is typically characterised by deviant or abnormal behaviour, the non-disabled majority is granted a legitimate means to exclude and isolate people with disabilities. As removed members of society, their contributions are often discredited and their successes are treated as aberrations. Likewise, the expectations of people with disabilities are chronically low, and there is an ever-present suggestion that their lives are not necessarily worth living. This identity has been argued to derive from the medical model, which defines a disability as a deficiency that restricts one’s ability to perform normal life activities. By adopting the social constructionist viewpoint, theorists and activists have contended that society has created disability by choosing not to remove structural constraints that would enable more people to participate and gain access to social resources. The social constructionist approach was an effective ideological rejoinder to the established medical model. Yet the question of how to convince the non-disabled majority that society has disabled certain individuals has not been adequately resolved. The activists attempted to adopt the social constructionist theory as a basis for a minority group model of disability. They would use this model to support a plea for action to people with disabilities as a mechanism to overcome the oppression being inflicted upon them by the non-disabled majority. While it is clear that such a transformation of the definition of disability among academics and disability activists has clearly taken hold, the disability movement appears to have achieved only limited success in changing the views of the non-disabled majority. By accepting the reward of civil rights protection without insisting that the medical model be publicly dismantled, the hopes of the disability activists to change the views of the broader public may have been sacrificed. The willingness to make this concession may have stemmed from the belief among social constructionist theorists that society will change its perception of disability if it is merely demonstrated that the prior notion has been made unjustly. From a structural point of view, it would seem to take much more to convince a dominant group in society that it needs to redistribute power and access to its treasured resources. The more desirable arrangement to the non-disabled majority is one that maintains the superiority of people with ‘normal’ abilities. As a result, the disabled are typically described as dysfunctional and are often perceived to be incapable of understanding the world in the same way that ‘normal’ people do. Although social constructionists argue that such judgements regarding how people should be able to think or act are subjective notions that stem from dominant social ideologies, they may be said to underestimate the extent to which those ideologies are created and legitimated by the non-disabled majority because they best serve their interests.
The affirmative essentializes the experiences of the disabled and the non-disabled and their perspectives on germline gene editing
Humphrey, Faculty of Applied Social Sciences, The Open University UK, 2k (Jill C., Disability & Society, Vol. IS, No. I, “Researching Disability Politics, Or, Some Problems with the Social Model in Practice”, Proquest, p. 64-65)
In academic texts, the social model begins with an appreciation of the individual and collective experiences of disabled people (e.g. Swain a al, 1993). It goes on to elaborate the nature of a disabling society in terms of the physical environment, the political economy, the welfare state and sedimented stereotypes (e.g. Barnes et ah, 1999). Finally, it endorses a critical or emancipatory paradigm of research (e.g. Barnes & Mercer 1997a). This analysis lends itself to a recognition of the array of diverse experiences of disabling barriers; a realistic appraisal of the need for broader political coalitions to combat entrenched structural inequalities and cultural oppressions; and an openness about the potential for non-disabled people to contribute to critical theory and research. In activist discourses, the emphasis is upon the fact that it is non-disabled people who have engineered the physical environment, dominated the political economy, managed welfare services, controlled research agendas, recycled pejorative labels and images, and translated these into eugenics policies. This analysis lends itself to a dichotomy between non-disabled and disabled people which becomes coterminous with the dichotomy between oppressors and oppressed; and this tightens the boundaries around the disabled identity, the disabled people's movement and disability research. Whilst this hermeneutic closure is designed to ward off incursions and, therefore, oppressions from non-disabled people, it may also have some unfortunate consequences. I would like to illustrate these consequences by drawing upon a research project involving the four self-organised groups (SOGs) for women, black people, disabled members, and lesbian and gay members in UNISON (see Humphrey, 1998, 1999). Material drawn directly from conversations and observations in the disabled members' group is supplemented by interview transcripts with members of the lesbian and gay group, my own personal experiences of and reflections upon disability and discrimination, and recent developments in various social movements and critical research texts. The rest of the article depicts three problematic consequences of the social model in practice and redirects them back to the social model as critical questions which need to be addressed by its proponents. First, there are questions of disability identity where a kind of 'purism' has been cultivated from the inside of the disability community. Here, it can be demonstrated that some people with certain types of impairments have not been welcomed into the disabled members1 group in UNISON, which means that the disability community is not yet inclusive, and that its membership has been skewed in a particular direction. Second, there are questions of disability politics where a kind of 'separatism' has been instituted. Whilst the UNISON constitution allows for separatism to be supplemented by both coalitions and transformations, these have been slow to materialise in practice, and the dearth of such checks and balances in the wider disabled peoples* movement implies that the danger of developing a specific kind of disability ghetto is more acute. Third, there are questions of disability research where a kind of 'provisional-ism1 is suspended over the role of researchers. The most obvious dilemmas arise for the non-disabled researcher as would-be ally, but it is becoming clear that disabled academics can also be placed in a dilemmatic position, and it is doubtful whether any researcher can practise their craft to their own standards of excellence when operating under the provisos placed upon them by political campaigners.
The ableism arguments lock in certain notions of difference – turns the aff
Roberts, Baylor University, Masters thesis in Communication, 7 (Jeff, The Rhetorical Structure of Disability: Bridging the Gap Between What is ‘Spoken’ and What is ‘Said’ with Song - Over-Signifying with Personhood Against the Backdrop of Disease-Centric Discourse, , Pg.7-8)
Founding action towards people with disabilities upon notions of difference, placing a primacy on difference particularly in the context of incorporation, domestication, and acceptance of such difference, dooms the struggle for equality to failure. “Over recent centuries all forms of violent otherness have been incorporated, willingly or under threat of force, into a discourse of difference which simultaneously implies inclusion and exclusion, recognition and discrimination (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129).” Once the Native American “savage” became “accepted” under U.S. law as “human,” or rather a different type of human, it was not long until viral hatred forced new boundaries of difference to be erected, and segregation of such difference to be enacted in the form of the reservation. Where the “savage” or “monster” is never understood, or assimilated, remaining radically exotic to the oppressive guise of society, when “accepted” by society on the basis of “difference” viral racism allows only two options for the future: assimilation or extermination (Baudrillard, 1993). Similarly, modern medicine has facilitated society with an understanding of disability, allowing it to accept the “different” or “disabled” person under law as “human,” more specifically a “disabled human” in which is different from “normal” individuals, but none the less similar. “Madness, once its exclusionary status had been revoked, was caught up in the far subtler toils of psychology (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129).” As soon as society began to understand and consequently attempt to “accept” the “monster” other, the other traded its quality of foreign “monsterness” for qualities of “feebleness,” with the social acceptance of the others difference, the “monster” soon became the “mongoloid.” “Difference” annihilated the subaltern subject by making all that was foreign and radically exotic within easy reach of societal understanding. With a compassion rooted in pity, and fear founded upon difference, society became locked into a mode of interaction with disability, and the individuals’ disability located itself within, which mandated oppression in the spirit of viral hatred.