The best empirical evidence disproves the inequality-crisis-cooperation link
Bordo 12 – Michael D, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Monetary and Financial History at Rutgers University, PhD from the University of Chicago, and Christopher M. Meissner, professor of economics at UC Davis, PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley. “Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?”, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 17896, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w17896/w17896.pdf, 03-xx-2012
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. has been attributed to a rise in inequality by several authors. In his 2010 book, Fault Lines, Raghuram Rajan argued that rising inequality in the past three decades led to political pressure for redistribution that eventually came in the form of subsidized housing finance. Political pressure was exerted so that low income households who otherwise would not have qualified received improved access to mortgage finance. The resulting lending boom created a massive run-up in housing prices which reversed in 2007 and led to the banking crisis of 2008.¶ Along these lines, Kumhof and Rancière (2011) study the links between inequality, credit and crises complementing the Rajan hypothesis with a DSGE model. In this model, rising inequality and stagnant incomes in the lower deciles lead workers to borrow to maintain their consumption growth. As these households become increasingly indebted, they continue to borrow more to maintain their consumption. This increases leverage, and eventually a shock to the economy leads to a financial crisis. They posit that their story holds both for the 1920s stock market boom in the US and the run up to the 2008 crisis. The focus on income inequality by Kumhof and Rancière and Rajan is a novel approach to understanding macroeconomic outcomes prior to the recent financial crisis, and to the Great Depression. The theme deserves further empirical scrutiny from other time periods and countries.¶ There is reason to wonder about the generality of this new view since income inequality rarely plays a significant role in the large literature on financial instability and credit booms. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) study the experience of a large number of advanced and emerging economies since the 1960s finding that current account deficits, strong economic growth and fixed exchange rates accompanied credit booms. Borio and White (2003) have also elaborated a view of pro-cyclical financial systems. Periods of expected low and stable inflation, strong economic growth and liberalized finance can give rise to complacency amongst borrowers, lenders and regulators. Endogenous market forces that might normally “rein in” these imbalances seem to be absent. Massive buildups in credit lead to financial instability in this case. Income inequality plays no active role in generating the boom-bust outcome in these contributions. ¶ In this paper, we present new empirical evidence on whether rising inequality has any explanatory power in accounting for credit booms and financial crises. Rather than limiting the focus to inequality as the Rajan/Kumhof/Rancière (RKR) frameworks do, we control for more traditional determinants of the credit cycle. Different from these authors, we also bring evidence from a much larger sample than the two unique periods in US economic history that are the focus of RKR. Our sample is a panel of 14 mainly advanced countries from 1920 to 2008 covering a wide variety of boom-bust episodes and financial crises.¶ We find very little evidence linking credit booms and financial crises to rising inequality. Instead, the two key determinants of credit booms are the upswing of the business cycle or economic expansion and low interest rates. This is very much consistent with a broader literature on credit cycles. While inequality often ticks upwards in the expansionary phase of the business cycle, this factor does not appear to be a significant determinant of credit growth once we condition on other macroeconomic aggregates. Neither is income concentration a good predictor of the financial crises that often follow above average growth in credit. The anecdotal evidence from several historical credit booms finds little support for the inequality/crisis hypothesis.