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Risk of bioterror from CRISPR is crying wolf – its too complex and no empirics

Kathleen M. Vogel And Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 18, (Kathleen M. Vogel And Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 10-23-2018, Cambridge Core, Anticipating emerging biotechnology threats, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-the-life-sciences/article/anticipating-emerging-biotechnology-threats/CCBB40DBD2BCE6CECDE9F2ACB71588CE, 6-27-2022) SCade

These developments prompted policymakers and security analysts to begin pondering the security implications of CRISPR and evaluate its potential use for bioweapons developments. CRISPR scientists have themselves advanced several scenarios for bioterrorism, including the use of gene drives to create more lethal or infectious pathogens. Some scientists have argued that the expertise required to develop gene drives can be acquired relatively easily and that an amateur scientist could set up a lab in his garage and develop a gene drive undetected. Additional questions that have been raised include the following: Could CRISPR be used to introduce antibiotic resistance into a bioweapons agent? Will CRISPR allow the development of chimeric bioweapons — weapons that cause the symptoms of one disease but ravage the body with a different, undetected disease? Echoing these concerns, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper included gene editing in his 2016 worldwide threat assessment report to Congress. Clapper warned, “Given the broad distribution, low cost, and accelerated pace of development of this dual-use technology, its deliberate or unintentional misuse might lead to far-reaching economic and national security implications.” In the fall of 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology called for a new biodefense strategy that would address emerging biotechnology threats like CRISPR that open up new possibilities for misuse. 22 At the international level, United Nations entities are also struggling with how to regulate and anticipate nefarious international developments in gene-editing technologies. 23 To date, however, most policy and public discussions about CRISPR have focused on the technology — how it will drive new kinds of security threats — as if it existed in a vacuum. This kind of technological determinism — the belief that technology is the primary driver of history and contemporary life — has underpinned many popular narratives regarding American technological innovation since the Industrial Revolution. This way of understanding technology, however, oversimplifies what it takes, and how long it takes, to develop, use, and diffuse technology for beneficial or nefarious applications. Technology never develops and diffuses in isolation — it is always shaped by a variety of social forces — and understanding the complex interconnecting set of push-pull factors on technology is important to getting threat assessments right. Since the 1980s, there have a variety of actors “crying wolf” 4 engineering techniques for harm. Yet we have little empirical data over the past 30 years that show a specific state or terrorist group using any of these new biotechnological innovations to create biological weapons. And, even those who are known to have dabbled in applying genetic engineering to produce bioweapons (e.g., the Soviet Union) encountered a series of technological, social, political, organizational, and economic hurdles that prevented the development of viable weapons. Thus, existing data suggest a very mixed picture on the ability of individuals, groups, or countries to use new biotechnologies for harm. What the existing data do make clear, however, is that it is not just access to, or emergence of, science and technology that leads to a threat but how a variety of social, economic, organizational, and political factors shape the development and use of science and technology. This latter point is left out of existing dystopian bio-imaginaries, but it is critical to assess the threat posed by CRISPR or any emerging biotechnology.

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