Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Can’t ban; LAWS meet the International Humanitarian Law threshold and therefore are fair game

Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", file:///C:/Users/ncb12/Downloads/Nathan%20Boyle%20Overcoming%20International%20Inertia_%20The%20Creation%20of%20War%20Manual%20for%20Lethal%20Autonomous%20Weapons%20Sy.PDF) (NB)

When developing new military technology, States must evaluate whether the technology can be operated in compliance with core[International Humanitarian Law] IHL principles. Under Article 36 of Geneva Convention Protocol I ("Protocol I"), in order to develop, acquire, or adopt a new "weapon, means or method of warfare," the State must first conduct a review to determine whether the technology would violate IHL in "some or all circumstances." 25The weapons review obligation of Article 36 has likely not reached the status of customary international law. 26Indeed, only a few States currently utilize systematic approaches to weapons review. 27 [*158] However, States are still bound by the underlying IHL obligations of weapons law and targeting law, even if they do not conduct a formal review prior to implementation. 28 The first step is to review whether the weapon is already prohibited or restricted by existing treaty or customary law. 29Next, the state must evaluate whether the weapon can be used in accordance with the core IHL obligations. 30The State is not required to evaluate all possible misuses of the weapon, but rather the evaluation should relate to the "normal or expected use" of the weapon. 31Finally, if no existing treaty or customary law would prevent the weapon's use, the State should evaluate whether its use would violate the 'Martens Clause'. 32The Martens Clause is a catch-all provision that is intended to provide baseline level protections to civilians, requiring States to act from the "principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience," even in the absence of positive treaty law. 33According to the ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, the purpose of the Martens Clause is to "prevent[] the assumption that anything which is not explicitly prohibited by the relevant treaties is therefore permitted" and to protect the core principles of IHL "regardless of subsequent developments of types of situation or technology." 34Many have argued that the Martens Clause is particularly important in ensuring adequate protection of civilians when weapons technology has developed faster than IHL can adapt to the technology. 35 In order for a new weapons technology to be compliant with IHL during its Article 36 review, the weapon must meet the obligations of "weapons law" and "targeting law". 36Weapons law [*159] evaluates whether a weapon is per se unlawful. 37Targeting law evaluates whether the weapon can be operated within a military environment in a lawful manner. 38These core IHL obligations are codified in Protocol I and have also been recognized as customary international law. 39 The first obligation of "weapons law" is that a weapon cannot be "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." 40To be legal, the weapon must have the capacity to target legitimate military objectives and must not create disproportionate harm to civilians and other noncombatants in at least some battlefield contexts. 41Examples of weapons that fail to meet this standard under customary IHL include incendiary weapons, cluster bombs, and biological weapons. 42The second "weapons law" obligation is that the weapon cannot cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 43The purpose is to prevent inhumane or needless injuries to combatants. 44The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has previously defined "unnecessary suffering" as "a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives." 45Historical examples of weapons that violate this obligation include lasers used to blind soldiers and "dum-dum" bullets (bullets that expand on impact causing large and painful wounds) -- as these weapons caused extreme suffering without progressing any legitimate military purpose. After a weapon is found not to be per se illegal under "weapons law", "targeting law" evaluates whether the weapon can be lawfully operated in a specific battlefield context. 47Two key principles of "targeting law" are (1) distinction and (2) proportionality. 48The requirement that actors distinguish between combatants 49and civilians, and between military and civilian objects, is a "cardinal" principle of IHL. 50The goal of distinction does not demand perfect results but instead requires that actors make decisions using reasonable judgment given the military context in which they are operating. 51Changes to the character of warfare, such as the increased presence of non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, have made it increasingly difficult for military actors to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in real-time combat operations. 52 Next, the principle of proportionality requires that actors balance the extent and risk of collateral harm against the military advantage of the operation or action. 53This is a highly context-specific assessment and has led international courts, military manuals, and others to adopt a "reasonable military commander" standard. 54For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described its standard for proportionality as follows: "In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably wellinformed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian [*161] casualties to result from the attack." 55Gross failures to account for the collateral damage of military operations can amount to a war crime. 56A weapon is not IHL compliant if it does not allow an operator to use their judgment when making targeting decisions within the given battlefield context. 57New weapons technology such as LAWS can only be lawfully used if the State can assure through an Article 36 review that the technology can adhere to IHL obligations within the battlefield context in which it is being used. LAWS technology raises a number of complex issues, ranging from the technical feasibility of IHL compliance, to legal and ethical questions over whether non-human intelligence should be allowed to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield, to the significant public policy implications of wars conducted by robots. 58The novelty of LAWS technology and these complex legal, moral, and practical considerations has resulted in a highly unsettled and contentious international legal status for LAWS development and use. 59 LAWS are not likely to be per se illegal under "weapons law" due to being indiscriminate in their impact or causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 60The evaluation of these factors is based on the nature of the weapon in the uses for which it is designed. 61 LAWS are not likely to be per se illegal [*162] under weapons law because, in theory, the systems can be designed to discriminate and not cause unnecessary suffering. 62LAWS are able to be designed with the ability to strike specific targets. 63This ability to control the impact of the weapon is an important point of distinction as compared to other weapons previously deemed indiscriminate, such as cluster bombs, chemical weapons, incendiary weapons, and anti-personnel landmines. 64And if LAWS use conventional forms of lethal force (e.g. standard bullets or explosives), the presence of autonomous functionality would not likely affect considerations of whether the weapon causes "unnecessary suffering" or "superfluous injury". 65The more significant legal questions are whether LAWS can be designed to comply with IHL "targeting law" and the degree of human involvement that is legally necessary. 66 In order for LAWS to be compliant with IHL "targeting law," "they must be able to reliably and predictably distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, as well as make rapid judgments on the proportionality of an attack against its potential collateral harms. 67First, there is a question as to whether computer algorithms will be able to gauge the complex, context-dependent, and humanistic clues that soldiers must use to distinguish combatants and non-combatants in the modern battlefield where combatants often attempt to conceal their identities. 68Second, even if such a distinction is technically [*163] feasible, there is a question as to whether these systems can reliably make sound decisions given the vast array and often rapidly changing nature of battlefield contexts. 69For example, one potential risk to the system's reliability is the introduction of bias to decision-making originating in the data sets used to train the AI system. 70Even if both of these technical feasibility questions can be adequately addressed, there is a further question as to whether lethal decision-making inherently requires human involvement under IHL. 71And if there is such a requirement, what degree of human involvement is sufficient to meet IHL obligations must also be determined.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.