Drones don’t cause radicalization—recruitment is a complex process
Aqil Shah, 6-10-2018, "Drone Blowback: Much Ado about Nothing?", Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/drone-blowback-much-ado-about-nothing <Aqil Shah is Wick Cary Assistant Professor of South Asian Politics in the David L. Boren College of International Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.>, ke
Targeted killings of suspected Islamist militants by armed drones have become the mainstay of U.S. counterterrorism campaigns in non-traditional conflicts in countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Analysts, human rights organizations, and former U.S. officials claim that drone strikes produce blowback: Rather than reducing the terrorist threat, drone strikes increase it by providing terrorist groups with fresh recruits. According to two prominent experts, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, “every one of these dead noncombatants [in Pakistan] represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.” Although intuitive, the blowback argument lacks empirical support. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has launched an estimated 430 drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004 (roughly 75 percent of its known total strikes worldwide). My research there shows that drone blowback may be much ado about nothing. Drawing on interviews with 167 well-informed adults from North Waziristan Agency (NWA), the most heavily targeted district in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), extensive interviews with respected experts on terrorism, and an official Pakistani police survey of 500 detained terrorists from southern Sindh Province, I find no evidence of a direct link between drones strikes and radicalization or the recruitment of militants, either locally or nationally. Instead, my data and secondary sources suggest that militant recruitment is a complex process driven by a variety of factors, such as political grievances, state sponsorship of militancy as a tool of foreign policy, state repression, weak governance, and coercive recruitment by militant groups—not drone strikes. At the local level, finding evidence of blowback from well-informed locals should be relatively easy given the dense social and kinship ties of NWA inhabitants. Virtually every family in NWA has been affected by the conflict, whether through the death of a relative, the destruction of property, or displacement resulting from a military offensive. Yet these people have largely been left out of debates about the threats they face and the effect these threats have on their lives. Moreover, the inhabitants of FATA identify themselves as members of a particular Pashtun qabail or qaum (tribe) divided into khels (sub-tribes), each of which consists of extended clans or families. Inhabitants are therefore enmeshed in dense social networks, which makes them uniquely informed about the effects of drone strikes on their community. Most respondents claimed to personally know or be aware of someone in their clan or village who had been involved in militant activity or who had been indirectly linked to militants, but none believed that the reason was the loss of a relative in a drone strike. As one tribal elder from Dande Darpa Khel in Miranshah, the drone-targeted headquarters of the Haqqani Network, explained: “We hear rumors that this or that man joined the Taliban or al-Qaeda because of anger over drone strikes. It is possible. But I know almost every family in my area, and I do not know of a case where a local man or boy joined the Taliban as direct result of death or injury to a close relative in a drone strike. In fact, most of the Taliban fighters were already radicalized, or inclined toward militancy for various reasons, or forced to join these groups.” Comments like this came up frequently in my sample. Even local leaders of Islamist and other right-wing parties acknowledged that the ability of drone strikes to spawn militants is exaggerated. The views of this informed group of NWA residents rest on pragmatic calculations. Most were resentful of the coercive tactics the Taliban used to terrorize and control the local population, especially after the Pakistani military struck a peace deal with them in September 2006. Taliban tactics included taxation and harsh penalties for minor offenses. Local resentment is also rooted in state repression. Until recently, FATA was governed under the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (enacted under British rule in 1901), which prescribes harsh penalties for crimes without the right of appeal in a court of law, including collective responsibility for offenses committed by one or more members of a tribe or those committed by anyone in its area. During its operations, the Pakistani military has used collective punishments, including economic blockades, to punish families or clans whose members they suspected of harboring foreign militants. The state’s application of these draconian and often indiscriminate measures against the local population, and its appeasement of militants through peace agreements, has only compounded local alienation stemming from counterinsurgency operations that, some studies show, benefit insurgents. But in North Waziristan, many locals are alienated from both the Pakistani state and the militants.