Yes great power war---rising geopolitical rivalries.
Brands & Feaver 2017—Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins // Peter Feaver is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke and the director of the American Grand Strategy Program and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies [“Stress-Testing American Grand Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 6, December/January, p. 104-105]
This assumption is now being tested, however, as the spectre of greatpower war revives. Russia and China – two key powers that were never fully reconciled to the post-Cold War order – are now pushing back against that order more assertively than ever before. Russian President Vladimir Putin has used force to halt the feared spread of Western influence and institutions into the former Soviet space. He has also used Russia’s revived military power to intimidate US allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, and to harass US and NATO forces in international waters and airspace. China, as noted previously, is likewise using military and paramilitary forces to coerce US allies, to adjust maritime boundaries by force and to exert pressure on neighbours from Japan to Vietnam.
Both Moscow and Beijing, moreover, are developing warfighting capabilities and strategies designed to deny Washington access to their ‘nearabroads’, and to prevail in a limited military conflict with the United States and its allies. As one US Navy official has noted, Chinese forces have been training for a ‘short sharp war’ with Japan – and presumably, by extension, with America as well.34 For its part, Moscow has regularly staged major military exercises along NATO’s eastern flank, and has re-emphasised nuclear weapons in its rhetoric and planning.35 In other words, neither Russia nor China is acting – or talking – like it believes that great-power war is obsolete. And neither, for that matter, is the United States, as the Pentagon invests in a Third Offset Strategy meant to re-establish American military dominance vis-à-vis great-power rivals.36
At present, few analysts believe that either Russia or China wants a war with Washington, and there are still powerful brakes on the possibility of great-power conflict. But it is clear that America once again has great-power rivals, that those rivals are increasingly willing to assert themselves even at risk of heightened geopolitical tensions, and that the risk of great-power conflict has therefore risen to a level higher than at any time since 1989. As the US National Military Strategy warned in 2015, ‘Today, the probability of US involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing.’37 If great-power geopolitical competition continues to intensify in the coming 10–20 years – as most commentators expect it will – American assumptions about the obsolescence of major-power war, and the striking great-power peace that has characterised the post-Cold War era, will only be further challenged. We may find that the seeming respite from history that accompanied the end of the Cold War is finally coming to an end; the world, and the United States, may find itself heading ‘back to the future’ of international affairs, as John Mearsheimer predicted a quarter-century ago.38