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Yes it’s nuclear and escalates—multiple warrants and empirics provide a strong basis for our predictions

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring_13/lieber.pdf]

A second set of arguments stems from the problem of nuclear escalation and the future of the US nuclear arsenal. Our main claim is that deterring nuclear conflict will be much more difficult in the coming decades than many analysts realize. As nuclear weapons proliferate, it becomes increasingly likely that the United States will find itself in conventional conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Those adversaries understand the consequences of losing a war to the United States—prison or death typically awaits enemy leaders. 7 Coercive nuclear escalation as a means of creating stalemate and remaining in power is one of the only trump cards available to countries fighting the United States. Some analysts might scoff at the notion that a rational leader would use nuclear weapons against a superpower like the United States. But that retort conflates the logic of peacetime deterrence with the logic of war, and it ignores history. During peacetime, almost any course of action is better than starting a nuclear war against a superpower. But during war—when that superpower’s planes are bombing command and leadership sites, and when its tanks are seizing territory—the greatest danger may be to refrain from escalation and let the war run its course. Leaders of weaker states—those unlikely to prevail on the conventional battlefield—face life-and-death pressures to compel a stalemate. And nuclear weapons provide a better means of coercive escalation than virtually any other. The notion of countries escalating conflict to avoid conventional defeat may sound far-fetched, but it is well grounded in history. When nuclear-armed states face overwhelming conventional threats—or worry about the possibility of catastrophic conventional defeat—they often adopt coercive escalatory doctrines to deter war or stalemate a conflict that erupts. Pakistan openly intends to use nuclear weapons to counter an overwhelming conventional Indian invasion. Russia claims it needs theater nuclear weapons to counter NATO’s conventional advantages. Israel expects to win its conventional wars but retains the capability for nuclear escalation to prevent conquest in case its conventional forces suffer a catastrophic defeat. The discussion of coercive nuclear escalation should sound familiar to Western analysts, as it was NATO’s strategy for three decades. From the mid 1960s until the end of the Cold War, NATO planned to deter war, and stalemate it if necessary, through coercive nuclear escalation. NATO understood that—by the mid 1960s—it could no longer win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, but it still based its national security strategy on coercive escalation because it believed Warsaw Pact conventional forces were overwhelming. In short, the escalatory dynamics that existed during the Cold War exist today—and they are just as powerful. States still face the same critical national security problem they faced during the Cold War and throughout history: namely, how to prevent stronger countries from conquering them. The high-stakes poker game of international politics has not ended; the players and the cards dealt have merely changed. Those who were weak during the Cold War are now strong, and another set of militarily “weak” countries—such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and even China and Russia—now clutch or seek nuclear weapons to defend themselves from overwhelming military might, just as NATO once did. What can the United States do to mitigate the problem of escalation? Ideally, it should avoid wars against nuclear-armed enemies. But that option may not be possible given current US foreign policy and alliances. War may erupt on the Korean Peninsula, ensnaring the United States in a battle against a desperate nuclear-armed foe. In the future, Washington may fight a nuclear-armed Iran over sea lanes in the Persian Gulf. And the United States could someday be dragged into war by a clash between Chinese and Japanese naval forces near disputed islands. Alternatively, the United States could seek to develop conventional war plans designed to wage limited war without triggering enemy escalation. Development of alternative plans is sensible, but history shows that wars are difficult to contain, and modern conventional warfare is inherently escalatory. A third option to mitigate these dangers is to retain, and improve, US nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities. Fielding powerful counterforce weapons may help deter adversary escalation during war— by convincing enemy leaders to choose a “golden parachute” rather than escalation—and would give US leaders better response options if deterrence failed. In particular, the United States should retain and develop nuclear weapons that bring together three key characteristics of counterforce: high accuracy, flexible yield, and prompt delivery. To be clear, sharpening US counterforce capabilities is not a “solution” to the problem of adversary nuclear weapons. Although, ceteris paribus, it would be better to have excellent counterforce capabilities than to lack them, given enough time and motivation, many countries could greatly increase the survivability of their forces. But given the plausible prospect that the United States will find itself waging war against nuclear-armed states, and given the powerful incentives of US adversaries to brandish or use nuclear weapons, it would be reckless to proceed without a full suite of modern nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities.

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