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Russian cyberattacks cause NC3 entanglement

Whyte ’22 [Christopher; March 31; assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University; World Politics Review, “Cyber and Nuclear Threats Make for a Dangerous Mix in Ukraine,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30439/cyber-and-nuclear-make-for-a-dangerous-mix-in-the-ukraine-war/ceng

To say that the world is closer to the brink of nuclear war today than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 feels less controversial by the day. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently told media representatives that the “prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility.” Certainly, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been signaling a willingness to at least consider the nuclear option. In late February, he raised the readiness level of Russia’s nuclear response force, stating that Western interference in the ongoing war in Ukraine will result in “consequences greater than any you have faced in history.” And despite calming messaging from the Biden administration, further Russian mobilizations—including the deployment of nuclear missile launchers to Siberia and nuclear submarines to the Barents Sea for supposed “drills”—have continued to stoke public fears over nuclear weapons’ use. Even Russia’s recent pledge not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine has done little to calm fears about the potential use of tactical nuclear devices, with many claiming the statement is nothing more than an attempt to bolster Moscow’s negotiating position. Amid these rising nuclear tensions, there is one dimension of potential escalation that has not yet received much public attention: that of a cyber-enabled nuclear event. It’s time for policymakers to consider whether cyber operations affecting elements of nuclear command, control and communications, or NC3, systems could prompt nuclear escalation in the current crisis. Experts across the West have been scrambling to place Putin’s threats, both tacit and explicit, in strategic and political context in order to gauge the possibility of a nuclear escalation leading to nuclear war. Others still have more narrowly—and perhaps more realistically—focused their analysis on what strong nuclear threats mean for fraught international engagement with Russia, and on whether Putin is likely to authorize the use of any nuclear weapons at all. On the digital side of things, experts on cyber conflict have thus far narrowly focused their attention on the non-nuclear aspects of tactics being employed in the war. Scholars rightly predicted that the “cyber blitzkrieg” anticipated by many pundits was unlikely, pointing out that, contrary to popular portrayals, cyber instruments actually make for poor tools of coercion and battlefield augmentation. By contrast, the entry of so many nonstate and semi-state cyber forces into the conflict on both sides, including nearly 300,000 volunteers coordinated by the Ukrainian government and a pro-Russia equivalent calling itself “Killnet,” was less expected. Even given so much robust analysis of the ongoing war, the nuclear tie-in has remained curiously underexamined. This is particularly concerning given the manner in which scholars have in recent years suggested that the logic of cyber warfare could undermine the logic of nuclear deterrence under highly specific circumstances. Overall, experts are right to dismiss the threat of a so-called “cyberwar,” a fantastical scenario that contradicts what we know about the strategic and operational functions of cyber instruments. But could cyber operations affecting elements of NC3 prompt nuclear escalation in the current crisis? Perhaps. The conflicting logics of cyber and nuclear warfare, when considered in the context of the present crisis, suggest real reasons to be concerned about the possibility of a cyber-enabled nuclear escalation. Off the bat, it’s important to remember that several elements involved in that question could present themselves in a range of ways. Nuclear escalation itself could take a number of forms, from additional escalatory rhetoric or mobilization to the actual use of a nuclear weapon. Likewise, a cyber operation impacting NC3 systems—which essentially comprise the networks of intelligence sensors, communications systems, other early warning assets and arms control mechanisms that underlie a country’s nuclear deterrent forces—could be an actual attempt to interfere with a nation’s deterrent capability by means of disrupting or taking over an element of its command system. That could be perceived by the targeted party as a prelude to a preemptive strike. But it could also be something as simple as an exploratory probe not intended to subvert system functions. Significantly, these different attacks could be hard to differentiate from the defensive perspective and so misinterpretation is entirely possible. While countries like Russia and the United States have historically reacted with caution to nuclear provocations, uncertainties borne of the current crisis might diminish that inclination. Such uncertainties could also encourage Russian leaders to lend less weight to the cyber attribution problem—that is, the difficulty inherent in identifying the party responsible for a cyber-attack that, even under ordinary circumstances, complicates efforts to organize an appropriate response. Even more concerning than the uncertainties bound up in interpreting certain cyber actions is the oft-cited and well-documented vulnerabilities of most states’ NC3 systems. Scholars have noted that NC3 weaknesses are widespread and, at times, quite glaring. There’s little doubt that American or Russian second-strike capabilities could be made to function effectively in the event of a nuclear war. But both sides’ reliance on a blend of new and legacy technologies to coordinate a complex detection, analysis and strike apparatus for nuclear weapons virtually guarantees errors in how these systems function as a whole. For example, in the past, American forces have lost contact with launch systems for hours due to faulty circuitry. At other times, they have detected false launches because legacy machinery was mishandled by operators. These base conditions are cause for at least minimal concern. Both the probability of either side’s NC3 systems being vulnerable to some form of cyber compromise and the possibility that either side might mistakenly believe its NC3 is being targeted by hostile foreign cyber operations clearly create the potential for a cyber-enabled nuclear event where perceived cyber-preemption against NC3 leads directly to either coercive or real military escalation. Admittedly, the stakes of nuclear weapons’ use suggest that escalation is not an especially likely outcome most of the time, even given these known issues. But unique circumstances might change this calculus. In particular, the conflicting logics of cyber and nuclear warfare, when considered in the context of the present crisis, suggest real reasons to be concerned. Nuclear and cyber forces are polar opposites with regard to their operational features. The former relies on open signaling to “warn” adversaries about potential consequences in order to generate a deterrent effect. The latter typically banks on secrecy, exploiting the element of surprise to avoid giving an opponent the opportunity to upgrade their defenses. The combination of the two creates unusual commitment problems, where the coercive brinksmanship usually on display in nuclear contests might be absent as one side tries to use cyber instruments to neutralize the other’s NC3. Importantly, with cyber in the mix, the side that detects cyber activity targeting NC3 will likely also notice that the attempted breach was done in secret, creating new uncertainties over how they might respond to such an attack. In addition to the potential weaknesses of NC3 systems, the unique political dynamics currently on display in Moscow, where Putin seems to be both isolated and dependent on politicized intelligence that has effectively undermined his decision-making, complicates this game of nuclear chicken. Given the difficult intelligence assessments and operational decisions that any government trying to reconcile cyber and nuclear logics in real-time will be required to make, this is worrisome to say the least. And Russia’s many obvious logistical failures in launching its invasion are cause for further concern. After all, objectively assessing the risks of cyber-enabled nuclear interference requires having the ability to locate potential NC3 compromises and to mitigate any that are found. This means robust intra-service communication and deployment of expertise, neither of which has been on prominent display in Moscow when it comes to the invasion of Ukraine. The range of cyber forces arrayed against Putin’s government in the current crisis also represents a potential source of further uncertainty that could produce cyber-prompted nuclear escalation. In addition to Ukraine’s cyber forces, which are active against Russian targets of all stripes, Kyiv has benefited from massive Western support for its operations in cyberspace, including from hacktivist elements to hundreds of thousands of volunteers that are being coordinated by Ukrainian state auspices. Added to this is the fact that, in addition to military equipment, Kyiv has been receiving non-battlefield aid from NATO member states, particularly those that are most geographically proximate, including Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. There is clearly a narrow situation here in which Russian leadership, under the current internal political conditions, may see possible Western intention in cyber events involving NC3 or related systems.

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