Deterrence in cyberspace is possible and sufficient to avoid conflict, but NATO having offensive capabilities is necessary to prevent Russian malfeasance
Maldre 16 – Patrik Maldre, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Moving Toward NATO Deterrence for the Cyber Domain,” May 2016, https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2446
Cyber deterrence clearly warrants more discussion among NATO members than ever, given the threats they now face—particularly from the East. Yet the Cyber Defence Committee doesn’t really cover it, nor will a full-fledged cyber deterrence concept be announced at the upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw. The main debate in Brussels and in national capitals centers on whether cyberspace should even be considered a domain of warfare, as many member states have already decide; the fuzzy concept of active cyber defense is only tentatively mentioned. However, senior NATO leaders have espoused deterrence as a potential future direction for the alliance. Importantly, several member states, including the United States, Britain and Estonia, are also publicly exploring such a strategy.20 The moment is not yet right for an alliance-wide declaration on this topic, but with concerted effort at all levels, NATO can and should continue to move toward deterrence for the cyber domain. Deterrence aims to discourage an adversary from taking offensive action. Traditionally, its two pillars have been deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment. The first refers to measures that reduce or eliminate the benefits of a certain aggressive move, while the second seeks to impose additional costs for performing it. NATO’s traditional mandate of defending its own systems fits comfortably into the deterrence-by-denial part of this framework. Deterrence-by-punishment, however, is far more controversial because of the problem of attribution—which refers to the difficulty of identifying the perpetrators of operations. Finally, both concepts also rely on intent, capability and credibility. As it stands, a palpable lack of trust among member states hinders collective action on both fronts. Progress in the denial category will be easier and more visible, but countermeasures should be considered as well. NATO has come a long way in terms of working together to shore up technical defenses in cyberspace. The main barrier to further cooperation, however, is the difference in technical and administrative capacities as well as human and financial resources among member states. This, along with differing national views, remains the main barrier to further integration. The alliance is only as strong as its weakest member. When it comes to deterrence-by-denial, therefore, all member states must have the basics in place: computer security laws, national cyber strategies, a police focus on cybercrime, national CERTs, public-private partnerships and capable intelligence agencies. From there, members should enact effective, actionable information-sharing programs. After that, the next step is to develop joint situational awareness. Typically, adversary espionage campaigns target multiple NATO and memberstate organizations simultaneously. Early warning and shared situational awareness can prevent multiple entities in different countries from being breached by the same operation. The end goal for the denial part of the deterrence strategy is, of course, resilience. If NATO and its members can effectively work together to prevent, detect, respond and recover from cyber attacks, this would significantly decrease the benefits and increase the costs for an adversary. NATO collective action should continue in this direction, and joint efforts can help to promote trust and confidence—a key ingredient in further cooperation in deterrence-by-denial, but even more crucial when it comes to deterrence-by-punishment. Preventing adversaries from benefitting from offensive actions, or at least limiting their gains, can help discourage them from conducting such attacks in the first place. Punishing them after the fact is another. While the term has an aggressive connotation, this part of the strategy is defensive and retaliatory in nature. It can refer to a broad spectrum of actions—from naming-and-shaming to nuclear strikes. In the cyber domain, the problem of attribution hinders the goal of effective deterrence. For this reason, NATO and its member states should invest heavily in the technological and analytical capabilities necessary to discern signs of a particular adversary, including in cooperation with the private sector. As numerous cases of attribution to Russian cyber threat actors demonstrate, this is already taking place. Furthermore, member states should complement technical attribution with political and diplomatic attribution. Currently, months and even years pass before politicians and leaders feel comfortable about ascribing blame. For deterrence to work, however, governments must carry out both high-level and private attribution in conjunction with media and private companies as soon as they have conclusive evidence. Calling out threat actors and their state sponsors in diplomatic forums, public discussions and private meetings can motivate them to conduct less aggressive operations. NATO and its member states should also adopt joint approaches to developing and employing offensive capabilities for collective defense purposes. Laudably, many individual allies have already declared that they possess such capabilities and the doctrines for using them. However, considerable mistrust persists among the allies, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and doubt—which weakens deterrence as a whole. To overcome this hurdle, allies can begin by making political statements about potentially using these capabilities in case of attack, and in accordance with international law as part of a collective defense response. Ultimately, NATO should move toward sharing these capabilities, perhaps by using existing models based on nuclear doctrine. Transparency and straightforwardness in this arena could contribute substantively to deterring adversaries and reinforce collective defense among NATO members. Intent and credibility will play into adversaries’ calculations for any type of countermeasure. For this reason, policy innovations and capability development need to be complemented by effective strategic communication. You cannot achieve deterrence if your adversary doubts that you’ll do what you say— and even less so if it doesn’t think you can do what you say. From this perspective, demonstrations such as the Aurora test in 2007 can be quite useful.21 Other, more subtle means include presentations by top officials at security conferences. Operations against third-party adversaries other than the intended target of deterrence can also deter attacks; few doubt that Russia paid close attention to the Stuxnet case, or that NATO drew conclusions from the Ukraine grid attack. In sum, effective strategic communication— both public and private—can be a key component or complement of a deterrence-by-punishment strategy.