Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Offensive capabilities allow iterative training that increases coordination

Lewis 15 – James A. Lewis, senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defence,” 2015, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/TP_08_2015_0.pdf

It could be argued, given NATO’s defensive orientation ( pace Russian fears of diabolic plots), that a purely defensive and technical focus for cyber operations is appropriate. The question, however, is whether NATO can field a credible military force without some public linkage to an offensive cyber capability. Here again, the nuclear precedent offers some suggestions for a way forward. In the NATO phonetic alphabet, “whiskey” (“W”) and “romeo” (“R”) were used by NATO’s command structure in conflict to “warn” capitals that with a deteriorating situation on the ground it would be sending a request to release nuclear weapons for NATO use. Romeo was the actual request for release of nuclear weapons to NATO control. This terminology prepared nuclear capitals to make the decision on release. Just as nuclear weapons remain under national control but senior NATO commanders can request their release, the US and UK could retain control of offensive cyber capabilities but be prepared to make them available to NATO commanders upon request. In practice, national teams could be assigned to support NATO commanders in theatre or could carry out some operations against targets selected by NATO commanders form their national duty station. Such an arrangement needs more than ad hoc coordination. It requires an identified structure for request and release that is regularly practised. It demands offensive cyber operations used for defence purposes to be included in planning and exercises. It would also be beneficial for NATO’s defence mission if the exercise of systems for the use of offensive cyber capabilities in support of defensive operations was made public. Cyber operations necessitate advance planning and practice, particularly for multinational operations that are already inherently complex in their coordination and de-confliction requirements. Offensive cyber operations create conflicts between goals and missions for the use of cyber techniques. The fundamental decision is whether to collect intelligence or to engage in military operations. This creates an immediate problem for NATO, because decisions on intelligence collection will be taken at the national level whereas military operations are in the purview of the NATO military command structure. This consideration would necessarily be part of the decision process in national capitals, which would likely be an iterative process to allow for additional input from the theatre of operations.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.