The best cyber defense is day-to-day cyber offense.
Bigelow '19 [Brad; June 2019; Principal advisor to Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, Information Services and Cyber Defence for planning, delivery and operation of CIS and CD capabilities throughout Allied Command Operations and NATO Crisis Response Operations, MS in Space Systems Engineering from the US Air Force Institute of Technology; "What are Military Cyberspace Operations Other Than War?” https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_10_What-Are-Military-Cyberspace-OperationsOther-Than-War.pdf]
Some have argued that military operations in cyberspace outside the context of armed conflict should be limited to the protection of military networks and information systems. Miriam Dunn Cavelty has flatly stated that “Militaries cannot defend the cyberspace of their country – it is no space where troops and tanks can be deployed because the logic of national boundaries does not apply” (Dunn Cavelty, 2012). Stephen J. Anderson agrees, writing that traditional concepts of national defense cannot be applied in cyberspace: “The US Navy defends the littoral territorial boundaries; air defenses, either through missile defense initiatives or alert aircraft, define airspace boundaries. Those lines are not readily identifiable in cyberspace” (Anderson, 2016). Some go even further, arguing that an active military role in peacetime cyber security undermines investment in alternative mechanisms. In a 2013 post for the Lowy Institute, Ian Wallace wrote that such efforts disincentivized “other longer-term and more sustainable efforts to address the new challenges that cyber brings to security systems” (Wallace, 2013). Yet this debate has evolved significantly in recent years, in large part thanks to increasing evidence of state-sponsored attacks on civilian cyberspace infrastructure. In a recent paper entitled Rethinking Cyber Security, James Lewis has stated that “The primary source of risk in cybersecurity comes from conflict between states” (Lewis, 2018). This assessment is echoed by the Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centrum, which concluded in its 2018 assessment that “The most significant threats are sabotage and disruption by nation-states” (National Cyber Security Centrum, 2018). As consensus on the state actor threat in cyberspace has grown, so have calls for the military to take a more active role in the defense of cyberspace. In the 2017 U.S. Senate deliberations on increasing the Secretary of Defense’s authority to conduct clandestine military cyberspace operations, Senator John McCain asserted that the need for a strong military role in peacetime was self-explanatory: “It’s the Department of Defense’s job to defend this nation: that’s why it’s called the Department of Defense” (Pomerleau, 2017). This more active role— sometimes referred to as defending forward—is reflected in recent updates to military cyber strategies. The 2018 U.S. Defense Department Cyber Strategy, for example, states explicitly: “We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia” and declares that this requires (and justifies) “action in cyberspace during day-to-day competition to preserve U.S. military advantages and to defend U.S. interests” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Similarly, the Netherlands’ Defence Cyber Strategy 2018, subtitled Investing in cyber striking power for the Netherlands, concludes that the current security environment demonstrates that “a more active contribution from Defence within the existing structures is required” (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2018). Jan Kallberg and Thomas S. Cook have gone even further, stating that nations should be prepared not only to use military cyberspace forces in peacetime but to actively foster these capabilities as an alternative to armed conflict: “Cyber is no longer a mere enabler of joint operations, but instead a viable strategic option for confronting adversarial societies” (Kallberg & Cook, 2017).