No Russia impact – too many constraints AND neither side risks war.
Mueller 21 – John, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, and member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 6: The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran”, Cambridge University Press, pg. 150-157, 03-04-2021
Russian Assertiveness The notion that a major war among developed countries is wildly unlikely has frequently been taken to have been challenged by the experience of the armed dispute between Russia and neighboring Ukraine that began in 2014. It resulted in the peaceful, if extortionary, transfer of Crimea, a large peninsular chunk of Ukraine, to Russia, and then in a sporadic, and ultimately stalemated, civil war in Ukraine in which ethnic Russian secessionist groups in a portion of Ukraine’s east were supported by Russia. The fear, in particular, is that Russia’s successful expansion – justified, it says, in part by the desire to protect persecuted ethnic Russians in a neighboring land – will cause, or tempt, it to expand elsewhere reflecting the manner in which Hitler expanded in order, he said, to protect ethnic Germans from persecution particularly in areas to his east. Indeed, NATO planners busily check roads in Western Europe to see if they are suitable for military transport in the event that Russia launches a full-scale invasion of the continent.50 And in 2018, at the badgering of President Donald Trump, NATO countries all agreed to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024, something he implied was a triumph although it merely reaffirmed a commitment they had made at the time of the Crimean takeover in 2014. 51 In the settlement that led to the unification of Germany in 1990, the United States verbally promised that, although East Germany would now become part of a NATO country, there would be no further expansion of the alliance to the east.52 A few years later, however, NATO began just such an expansion very much against many agitated concerns by specialists. Among these was George Kennan who warned that “the Russians will react quite adversely” and called the policy “a tragic mistake,” pointing out that “there was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.”53 The expansion was carried out with good intentions. and there were many statements seeking to mollify Russian concerns including offering it a sort of adjunct position in the alliance with the possible further prospect of actual membership.54 Nevertheless, although the Russians were powerless to stop the expansion, they greeted it with considerable dismay and opposition, voiced not just by Communists and by ultra-nationalists, but by very many in the Western-oriented elite. This should have been a warning. But it wasn’t. As Christopher Fettweis observes, “In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion – although nearly universal – were not taken seriously, since U.S. planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all.”55 The situation was strained further in 1999 when NATO bombed Serbia, a country with considerable historical links to Russia, securing the secession of the Kosovo province as Russia stood by helplessly, a development discussed in Chapter 3. Russia sometimes sees this as precedent for its Crimean seizure. As he was taking office as president of Russia in 2000, Vladimir Putin did tell a British interviewer, “Russia is part of European culture and I can’t imagine my country cut off from what we often refer to as the ‘civilized world’.”56 However, the strains from NATO expansion and from the Kosovo experience were already in place, and they gradually escalated in the new century as Putin’s regime became increasingly autocratic and as the United States, and particularly Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, together with its West European allies issued strong support for anti-Putin protests that took place in Russia in 2011–12. 57 Russia’s concern about NATO enlargement focused especially on the possible Westernization of Ukraine, the large new country to its west that had previously been part of the Soviet Union. One American observer who had served in the Obama administration supplies an arresting parallel: “The United States would hardly sit by idly if Russia formed an alliance with Mexico and Canada and started building military installations along the US border.”58 Unlike the neighboring countries to its west in what had previously been known as “East Europe,” Ukraine, although fairly open and democratic, had become a basket case economically despite an enormous potential. A few statistics may serve. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine’s per capita GDP was higher than Poland’s; 25 years later, it was less than onethird that of Poland.59 In a study comparing 25 post-Communist countries, Ukraine comes out dead last in economic growth.60 Ukraine is now the poorest country in Europe.61 In this, it was like other, smaller counties that essentially lie between Russia and Western Europe: Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. These countries have been characterized not by the substantial political liberalization and economic development that has variously taken place in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Romania, and in countries that emerged out of Yugoslavia after its breakup in 1991. Rather, the “in-between” countries, led by the most important, Ukraine, suffer from a set of what Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton call “post-Soviet pathologies”: dysfunctional governmental institutions, economies lacking functioning markets, a rule of law that is weak or absent, patronal politics, close links between political power and control of major economic assets, and “pervasive corruption.”62 In the case of Ukraine, this phenomenon has been exacerbated by outside efforts from Russia and from Europe to influence the country. These have made it easier for Ukraine to avoid desperately-needed reforms.63 Among these are huge economic distortions concerning energy. The world average for energy consumption per dollar of GDP is 10 British thermal units. For the US it is 7.5, for the UK 3.8, for Ukraine 56.3. 64 Things came to a head when mass protests by Western-oriented Ukrainians broke out in the capital city, Kiev. Their duly elected president, who was perhaps even more corrupt than his equally duly elected predecessors, had been juggling various opposing aid offers from the West and from Russia. When he more or less accepted the (higher) Russian bid, protests broke out, and these endured through the cold and snowy winter of 2013–14 heightened by sporadic violence by security forces and by elements within the protest movement, particularly those from the highly anti-Russian far right.65 In February 2014, Ukraine’s president fled to Russia abruptly leaving the extravagant private zoo he had created behind.66 In the subsequent chaos, parliament removed provisions that had previously allowed the use of Russian as an official language under some conditions.67 Largely ignored in these development were the interests of Russian speakers in the country, some 30 percent of the population, who are concentrated in the east and south and were decidedly unsympathetic to the Kiev protests.68 This was particularly the case in the large Crimea peninsula to the south where Russia, by an agreement brokered when the Soviet Union split up in 1991, maintains a substantial naval base for its Black Sea Fleet. Putin was alarmed at the developments in Kiev where anti-Russian ideologues now occupied one-third of the cabinet seats. He was also deeply concerned that the new government might abrogate or fail to renew the lease on the naval base, seen to be vital national asset.69 And he was doubtless miffed that Western leaders had boycotted the winter Olympics he had hosted a few months earlier.70 He bolstered troop strength at the naval base, and soon men in green uniforms without insignia (known as “little green men”) were fanning out in Crimea occupying military and government facilities.71 Crimean Russians often felt neglected over the years by government in Kiev, and they feared after the fall of the president that they would be violently persecuted.72 The local Crimean authorities organized a referendum on secession and on March 16, 2014, a vote, boycotted by many, was held in which 97 percent of those who voted supposedly supported leaving Ukraine and joining Russia. Backed enthusiastically by his parliament and by the citizenry of Russia, Putin graciously accepted the request. Meanwhile, in Donbas – areas abutting Russia in eastern Ukraine – local Russians, emboldened by the events in Crimea, organized a secession movement, setting up their own ad hoc governments. Ukrainian armed forces, led initially mainly by volunteer paramilitaries, were sent to put them down.73 Aided by infiltrators from Russia, the secessionists were able to hold them to a stalemate. Over 10,000 were killed in the violence.74 Ukraine cut off financial subsidies, electricity, and water supplies to Crimea, and tourism, an important Crimean industry, dropped precipitously. But Russia, at considerable cost, worked to alleviate these problems, and in 2018 a 12-mile $3 billion bridge – the contract went to one of Putin’s buddies, a former judo partner – had been constructed to link Crimea with Russia, a country that, otherwise, ranks ninety-fourth in the world in infrastructure. Putin drove the first truck across the span himself.75 Efforts to integrate Crimea into Russia have been extensive, and Russian retirees (especially military ones) are encouraged to move there even as those opposed to the Russian takeover often emigrate to Ukraine. If the goal of Russia was to keep Ukraine from seeking to embrace the West while, in Robert Person’s words, “establishing a pliant pro-Russian regime in Kiev,” its efforts failed miserably.76 As one observer predicted at the time, “Far from dissuading Ukrainians from seeking a future in Europe, Moscow’s moves will only foster a greater sense of nationalism in all parts of the country and turn Ukrainian elites against Russia, probably for a generation.”77 Or as Daniel Treisman observed in the aftermath, “If Putin’s goal was to prevent Russia’s military encirclement, his aggression in Ukraine has been a tremendous failure, since it has produced the exact opposite.”78 In addition, Russia’s experience in the 2014 conflict and crisis in Ukraine suggests that countries cannot engage in such enterprises without automatically paying a substantial economic price – it is something like an economic doomsday machine. Because of its antics, Russia suffered a decline in the value of its currency, capital flight, a drop in its stock market, and a decline in foreign investment. And, perhaps most importantly, there was a very substantial drop in confidence by investors, buyers, and sellers throughout the world, a condition that is likely to last for years, even decades.79 As Charap and Colton stress, “Moscow is at serious risk of permanently alienating the entire EU, which as a bloc has long been Russia’s largest trading partner and direct investor.”80 One prominent British observer puts it even more starkly, suggesting that the events “mark the end of an era, the end of the hope that Russia could be incorporated into a united and peaceful Europe.”81 As part of this, Russia’s behavior has set off a determined effort by Europeans to reduce their dependence on Russian energy supplies – a change that could be permanent. And the costs of the conflict and of supporting its new distant dependencies have been visited by Russia on itself. Crimea was less well off economically than most of Ukraine and required subsidies from Kiev.82 And the Donbas region was heavily subsidized by Ukraine as well.83 These burdens have now shifted to Russia. There have been other economic costs as well. Economic sanctions have been visited on Russia by other states. Although especially costly to Europe, they were embraced after rebels in eastern Ukraine (perhaps accidentally) shot down a civilian airliner with a missile presumably supplied by Russia.84 Unrelated to the crisis, there was a severe drop in prices for oil on the international market, a development that is especially harmful to Russia: for every decline of $25 in the price of oil, Russia experiences a nearly 2 percent decline in GNP, and oil and gas sales fund about 36 percent of the Russian annual budget. The economic pain inflicted by the oil price drop has been much greater – perhaps four times greater – than that of the sanctions.85 There is likely as well to be a special political cost for Putin. Since he came to power in 2000, there has been a steady improvement in Russia each year in GDP per capita. That process was reversed in 2014. From 2014–17, real disposable income fell by 15 percent.86 Aspirational purchases as for homes and cars have shifted to ones devoted to daily needs.87 And Russia’s Stabilization Fund, built up when oil prices were high and meant to fund pension payments and to support the ruble, was significantly depleted and may run out of money entirely. Over time, some may see this as a break with his promise to provide the stability and order necessary to allow economic progress to take place.88 The developments in Ukraine in 2014 were unsettling, of course. However, it is impressive that the United States and Western Europe never even came close to seriously considering the use of direct force to deal with the issue. Although the crisis created, as Steven Pinker notes, “just the kinds of tensions that in the past had led to great-power wars,” nothing like that took place.89 In fact, the West behaved in much the same way it would have behaved if it had not possessed a great and expensive military capacity. Indeed, President Barack Obama, who presided over the episode, was given to taunting his hawkish critics: “Now, if there is somebody in this town that would claim that we would consider going to war with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, they should speak up and be very clear about it.”90 The events inspired concerns that Putin had or has wider intentions.91 The natural next step, suggest some, would be some sort of invasion of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and/or Estonia. Each, like Ukraine, has a Russian minority which, in many cases, has not blended in well with the majority culture and might even consider itself to be persecuted. West Point’s Robert Person has looked at the parallels and finds them wanting.92 To begin with, Ukraine has what Person calls “a deep symbolic meaning for Russia.” It had been part of the Russian empire since the sixteenth century and is often considered to be “the cradle of eastern Slavic civilization.” Moreover, Crimea did not become part of Ukraine until it was “gifted” to that Soviet republic in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev in a process that was quixotic and arbitrary and never actually made official even by the regulations of Soviet or Communist law.93 And, of course, Crimea’s Russian naval base added special significance. By contrast, continues Person, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, unlike Ukraine, have frequently enjoyed an independent status, and Russians “have long recognized that the Baltics are culturally and historically different from Russia.” Moreover, Russians in the Baltics do not seem to have separatist interests not least in part because they have much higher standards of living than do their counterparts on the other side of the border. And because the Baltic states are members of the European Union and its associated Schengen zone, their citizens would no longer enjoy the associated ease of travel to the continent if they became part of Russia.94 In all, then, the notion that Putin’s Russia is on an expansionary mission, so commonly voiced at the time of the 2014 events, seems to have little substance.95 It has not even sought to officially annex separatist areas in eastern Ukraine. A special issue of the journal Daedalus, published in 2017, ran a series of essays dealing with Russia’s future. None envisioned territorial expansion.96 Definitions of superpower status common during the Cold War generally stressed the possession of stocks of nuclear weapons. If that criterion continued to be embraced, Russia should still probably be considered a superpower. However, as Dmitri Trenin points out, Russia “has few formal allies, no satellite states, and ... no ideology to compare with the comprehensive dogma of Marxism-Leninism.” Moreover, “although it is still a nuclear superpower, it lags far behind the United States in non-nuclear military capabilities. Economically, Russia – with its estimated 1.5 percent of the global gross domestic product – is a dwarf.”97 Its GDP ranks twelfth in the world, but is only one-fifteenth that of the United States and about half that of California. Moreover, GDP growth in Russia has been weak with recent figures at about 1.8 percent per year, and it relies heavily on selling energy abroad: nearly 50 percent of its exports are in oil and gas. Its population is shrinking and may, according to medium-term projections, be reduced to 125 million by 2094 from the current level of about 148 million. For an economy that is more people-intensive than other advanced economies, this spells trouble. As Barack Obama pointed out derisively, if undiplomatically, in his final news conference as president, “Their economy doesn’t produce anything that anybody wants to buy, except oil and gas and arms. They don’t innovate.”98 The (rather bizarre) Russia suffers from the same problems as the “in-between” counties as discussed above while being burdened in addition by a much larger military budget – although weak GDP growth has also been reflected in a shrinking military budget, down about 5 percent in 2018 from 2017. Like China, it has devolved into a form of crony capitalism where property rights are insecure, capital flight is common, corruption is rampant, and economic stagnation is likely. As Anders Aslund concludes, the state has been captured by a small group of top officials with the topmost being Vladimir Putin, who has 20 palaces, four yachts, 58 aircraft, and a collection of watches worth $600,000. 99 Ukraine episode of 2014 seems, like the Korean invasion of 1950, to be a one-off – a unique, opportunistic, and probably under-considered escapade that proved to be unexpectedly costly to the perpetrators. As with the Korean case, massive extrapolation is unjustified and ill-advised. That is, the Ukrainian venture, contrary to much initial speculation, does not seem to be a game-changer.100 As Trenin points out, Moscow’s most important objective is to reassert its role as a great power with a global reach. However, it does not seek to impose its own model on the world. In all this, neither side envisions a real shooting war against its adversary and neither wants to allow the situation to become uncontrollable.101