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No conventional invasion NOR escalation

Veebel 19 – Viljar, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. “Researching Baltic security challenges after the annexation of Crimea”, Journal on Baltic Security, Vol. 5, No. 1, Pg. 41-52, https://sciendo.com/pdf/10.2478/jobs-2019-0004, 04-30-2019

3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenarios The question whether Russia would use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region has also intrigued many academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016). Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis. Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and the probability of nuclear use is low, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavičius, 2017). A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that although Russia and NATO as potential conflict parties have a striking capability, it would be irrational for both of them to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. The authors stress that it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation

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