Status quo solves NATO cyber ambiguity
Khatuna Burkadze, 2018, (Khatuna Burkadze is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Professor Burkadze has been a Fulbright scholar at the MIT Center for International Studies as well as a visiting professor at Columbia University, Bard College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She has successfully completed programs on negotiations and security studies at Harvard University and George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies. Dr. Khatuna Burkadze has also implemented projects sponsored by NATO and the European Union which sought to increase awareness of both organizations inside Georgia. Dr. Khatuna Burkadze is an alumnus of the U.S. Department of State’s Program on American Foreign Policy as well as the author of dozens of articles and book chapters.), “A Shift in NATO's Article 5 in the Cyber Era?”, 42 Fletcher F. World Aff. 215 (2018), https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/forwa42&div=32&id=&page=/ceng
NATO'S CYBER DEFENSE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW The U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty (the founding treaty of NATO) were adopted in 1945 and 1949 when the creation of cyberspace was a matter of the future rather than a consideration of the times. Currently, it is clear that information and communication technologies have transformed the nature of war and changed historical understanding of armed attacks. Traditional applications of the use of force prohibition fail to adequately safeguard shared community values threatened by Computer NetworkAttacks (CNA)." The use of force is strictly limited in international law according to the U.N. Charter. Consequently, the central questions are the following: Could a cyberattack be equated to an armed attack according to international law? If a cyberattack equates to an armed attack, how should the principle of collective defense of NATO be interpreted to give member states legal guidance on the concept of a cyberattack? Do we need amendments in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to clearly define what constitutes a cyberattack? Answers to these questions can provide insights for defining rules of cyber operations in case of cyberattacks. The definitions of the use of force and armed attack are not provided in the U.N. Charter. In this regard, in its argument on a case concerning Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice rejected a narrow interpretation of "use of force" that limits the term to the employment of either kinetic force or non-kinetic operations generating comparable effects. The Court held that a state's arming and training of guerrilla forces engaged in hostilities against another state qualified as a use of force, a position that has since become widely accepted.'" The logic of the holding leads to the conclusion that non-destructive cyber operations may amount to a use of force. For example, providing malware to a rebel group and training its members to employ that malware in a destructive manner would seemingly qualify.20 However, every unfriendly act does not cross the use of force threshold. The International Court of Justice held that financing guerrillas, albeit an unlawful "intervention," did not fall into the same category. Therefore, cyber operations intended to economically coerce another state to engage in, or desist from, a particular course of action would not amount to a use of force; nor would financing a rebel group's cyber operations. Beyond these directly parallel examples, uncertainty remains as to where the threshold lies.2 1 The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence launched a major research project in late 2009 to examine the public international law governing cyber warfare2 2 and cyber operations, resulting in the Tallinn Manual 1.0 and Tallinn Manual 2.0. These two documents provide international experts' analysis on how existing international law applies to cyber warfare and cyber operations. Through Tallinn Manual 1.0, the International Group of Experts developed a nonexclusive list of factors that would likely influence the characterization of cyber operations by a state as a use of force: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, military character, state involvement, and presumptive legality. Additional factors found meaningful by the Experts included, inter alia, the prevailing political environment, the nexus of an operation to prospective military force, the attacker's identity, the attacker's track record with respect to cyber operations, and the nature of the target. These and other factors operate in concert as states make case-by-case determinations. Of them, severity alone can qualify a cyber operation as a use of force.23 In this regard, the Group unanimously agreed that any cyber operation causing greater than de minimis damage or injury suffices. For instance, they concurred that the damage to Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010 resulting from the Stuxnet virus crossed the threshold.24 As for the concept of cyberattacks and cyberwarfare, there are no widely accepted definitions. The U.S. Department of Defense defines "computer network attacks" as "actions taken by using computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves."2 5 Yale Law Professor Oona Hathaway and her colleagues have devised a broader definition of a "cyberattack." In a 2012 article, they wrote: "A cyberattack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security purpose." The article goes on to say that "any action" includes "hacking, bombing, cutting, inflecting, and so forth," as long as the action has the objective of undermining or disrupting a computer network. The word "purpose" seems to apply to the intent of the attacking party.26 According to the Tallinn Manual's Rule 30. "A cyberattack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects."27 In this regard, Professor Antonia Chayes, in an article titled, "Rethinking Warfare: The Ambiguity of Cyber Attacks," highlights that a cyber operation can constitute an attack even before the damaging consequences of such an operation become evident, citing the example of implanting malware that will be activated at a later time, but for which the intended consequences meet the requisite threshold of harm as an event that could be defined as an attack "irrespective of whether the malware is activated" this is a direct parallel to implanting. In a similar vein, a cyberattack that has been launched but defeated still amounts to an attack. The Manual does warn that great care should be exercised when identifying the perpetrator of the attack.28 Professor Chayes emphasizes that these definitional iterations help to refine the issues, although they cannot be expected to answer all questions. They do serve to narrow differences in approach somewhat and to begin to assure that officials are addressing common issues. However, the lack of internationally accepted distinctions among "cybercrime," "cyberattack," and "cyber war" make concerted international action more difficult to achieve. The definitions alone do not delineate civilian and military roles, nor do they designate a legal framework under which to operate, since the issue of whether an attack warrants a military response-even in the military domain-remains ambiguous. Economic attacks may be handled through a variety of international means, judicial and diplomatic. But crippling economic attacks without serious casualties might not be sufficient to warrant acts in selfdefense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter nor, as in the case of Estonia, a collective response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As for NATO's official position on interconnection between the existing international legal regulations and cyberspace, the Wales Summit Declaration (issued by the Allies in Wales on 4-5 September 2014) emphasizes: "Our policy recognizes that international law, including international humanitarian law and the U.N. Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyberattacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defense is part of NATO's core task of collective defense. A decision as to when a cyberattack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis."30 This means that, on the one hand, member states of the Alliance agreed that international law applies to cyberspace but, on the other hand, in the case of a cyberattack, a decision about invoking Article 5 will be made by the members of NATO based on the particular criteria. Therefore, the principle of collective defense is not an automatic mechanism. The exact criteria by which cyber incidents may trigger an Article 5 invocation of collective defense have not been determined. However, the North Atlantic Council is very likely to consider the following elements in its deliberations. " Scope: Is the incident widespread across a geographic area or industrial sectors? The wider the attack is, the more likely NATO action will be; " Duration: Is the incident a single event or does it last over time as part of a longer campaign? NATO is more likely to act for extended incidents; " Intensity/Scale: Has the incident caused death or substantial property destruction? If not, NATO is unlikely to declare collective defense; " External Actor: Is the incident directed from a foreign or domestic adversary? NATO is unlikely to act against a purely domestic foe.31