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Attacks are too risky and patching vulnerabilities solve

Valeriano et al. 18 – Brandon, PhD, Chair of Armed Politics at the Marine Corps University, Cyber Security Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Benjamin Jensen, Associate Professor at Marine Corps University and a Scholar-in-Residence at American University, School of International Service. Ryan Maness, an American cybersecurity expert, Defense Analysis Professor at Naval Postgraduate School. “Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion”, Oxford University Press, pg. 211-214, xx-xx-2018

What do the insights in this book tell us about the future of cyber exchanges between rivals? To paraphrase the acclaimed science fiction writer William Gibson, the future is already here, it is just not evenly distributed. The next 10 years will likely see an acceleration in the use of what Soviet thinkers called active measures and what George Kennan called political warfare. We are not optimistic that the current US administration will be able to sustain, much less lead, a multilateral cyber order that constrains the worst tendencies of rivals engaged in strategic competition. Yet, given the unique nature of cyber operations, we still assess minimal risks to covert action in cyberspace unleashing inadvertent escalation in the military domain. The world is witnessing the reawakening of an old strategic practice: political warfare. The connectivity of the modern world puts a premium on coercive diplomacy in the shadows. From election tampering and fake news disseminated across multimedia in Ukraine (2014), the United States (2016), and France (2017), states such as Russia use cyber operations to enable covert influence campaigns short of war. These operations extend beyond undermining democracies, and are also creating rifts among autocratic allies. In June 2017, an APT group linked to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) triggered a diplomatic crisis in the Persian Gulf by taking control of a Qatari news website. After hacking the online news feed, the group planted false information showing the emir praising Iran and calling for good relations with Israel while (contradictorily) backing Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (Bing 2017a). The intrusion was followed by a massive DDoS attack on Al-Jazeera, the Qatari owned media outlet (Kirkpatrick and Frankel 2017). In effect, UAE operatives conducted a classic psychological warfare operation that undermined the integrity of an alliance network. The news agencies in multiple Gulf States ran with the false story, leading to a diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. Cyber incidents like these show how states are mixing the old with the new. Much like the early Cold War, emerging cyber operations combine espionage, propaganda, economic warfare, and sabotage in an effort to signal resolve and shape adversary foreign policy (Valeriano, Maness, and Jensen 2017). The character of war and strategic competition is changing. The new Cold War is online. The connectivity of the digital domain amplifies the effects of political warfare. Social media helps rival states reach key constituencies in their competitor’s domestic populations, a phenomenon on display in the Russian purchases of ads on Facebook and Twitter during the 2016 US election. The extension of commerce and governance online creates vulnerabilities for states. Rivals can target economic capacity in a manner that used to require states to wage open, economic warfare. They can conduct sabotage through malicious code, as opposed to explosive satchel charges. The question that remains is, why are we not seeing more concessions as a result of cyber coercion? The answer lies in the unique character of cyber operations. Cyber instruments are a use-it-and-lose-it coercive instrument that come with an inherent amount of risk. To gain network access for higher-cost and compellence-producing degradations, states must first infiltrate and map their rival’s networks. This access gives them a position of advantage. They can extract information and monitor their rival, even if imperfectly. The decision on whether or not to execute a follow-up attack has to be balanced with the costs of losing network access. Once you convert your initial infiltration into an attack vector, you lose the access. In theory, this additional cost shifts the cost-benefit calculus associated with cyber operations in favor of restraint or using lower-level cyber disruptions that do not burn exploits because to do otherwise is quite risky. This “use it and lose it” dynamic is amplified by the shadow of the future unique to political warfare in the digital domain. For leading powers such as United States that have multiple cyber rivals (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea), the cost associated with burning a vulnerability is increased. Once a cyber operation is outed, states and the private sector move to patch the vulnerability. There are not an infinite number of vulnerabilities. Therefore, every attack, in theory, decreases the number of future attacks you can launch against a rival. For the United States, this condition means that if it chooses to launch a cyber degradation action against China, that specific attack vector will likely be lost in exchanges with Russia. Therefore, while the world is likely to see an increase in election hacking, false flag operations, DDoS attacks targeting key companies, and ransomware, there is unlikely to be an increase in political concessions. The risk of 21st-century cyber disruption and intrigue lies more in proliferation risks. A further constraining feature on launching cyber operations is the fact that, unlike a limited missile strike, the rival can copy the code and increase its own cyber capabilities. Rivals learn from and can emulate cyber coercive instruments at a faster rate than they can from military competition. States find it is easier to replicate code associated with a rival’s cyber offensive operation than they do building a fifth-generation aircraft based on stolen plans.

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