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Our impact is epistemologically sound – it’s based on readings of history and statistically strong modelling – empirics are the best way to make predictions – the alt causes extinction

Scott D. Sagan 95. Assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. 1995. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate.” p.115-116.

There are two basic kinds of errors that one can make in assessing nations other than one's own. The first error is rooted in ethnocentrism. This is a common mistake Americans make when looking at others: we too often assume that other nations are less competent, less intelligent, and less rational than the United States. Kenneth Waltz has performed an important service in this regard: his analysis of nuclear proliferation is a valuable corrective against such ethnocentrism and the blind spots it can create among both scholars and government officials. He is absolutely correct, in my view, to criticize a number of proliferation pessimists who argue, in effect, that the United States has been perfect in handling nuclear weapons (but others will not be), that the United States can control these awesome weapons forever (but no one else can), or that the United States has utterly unproblematic civil-military relations (but no one else does). Waltz's analysis should serve as a constant reminder of how dangerous it is in international affairs to assume, to put it crudely, that the United States is smart, but that other nuclear states are or will be stupid. The second basic error, however, is the opposite: to assume that others are better than we are. This is, I believe, the central problem with Kenneth Waltz's arguments about the consequences of proliferation. He now appears to accept many of the arguments made by scholars who have studied the operational accidents and near-accidents, conflicts in civil-military relations, and other organizational problems experienced by the United States during the Cold War. Yet he maintains that other states will do better, will be smarter, will learn more quickly, will, in short, avoid the kinds of errors that we have suffered in the past. I believe, in contrast, that there are both strong theoretical reasons and emerging empirical evidence to expect that new states will not avoid such problems. New nuclear powers may not make exactly the same mistakes as their predecessors; but they are likely to make their own serious errors, and some will be deadly.

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