Cooperation with NATO symbolizes a commitment to a common western identity grounded in the logic of threat construction and securitization
Gabi Schlag Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s. Uses of “the West”, 156–178. doi:10.1017/9781316717448.008 Print publication year: 2016
One could imagine that the saying ‘There is life in an old dog yet’ fits quite well for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many serious challenges threatened its cohesion, such as the Suez crisis in 1956, the disputes over the so-called double-track decision in 1979, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1993. While the history of the alliance has often been told as a history of crises (e.g. Stanley Hoffman, 1981), neither internal disputes over the war in Iraq nor the disappearance of a ‘communist threat’ have led to a break-up of NATO. The transatlantic alliance lives on. It has even expanded in size and tasks after the end of the Cold War. Recent tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia over Crimea and Ukraine make clear that the Atlantic alliance is anything but dead. As Stephen Walt put it: ‘NATO owes Putin a big thank-you’ (Walt, 2014). In International Relations (IR), debates on the Atlantic alliance have witnessed ups and downs as well. While realist, liberal, and institutionalist scholars strove to explain the existence and persistence of NATO by referring either to an alliance against threat (Walt, 1990, 1997), an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995, Risse, 1996), or a security manager (Wallander, 2000), other approaches have advocated a more critical and reflective understanding of the discourses and practices which constitute(d) the alliance in the first place (Klein, 1990; Bially Mattern, 2005; Behnke, 2013; Hellmann, 2006; Jackson 2003; Neumann and Williams, 2000; Pouliot, 2010; Adler, 2008). NATO’s lasting ability to overcome internal and external challenges to its cohesion, I will argue, directs our attention exactly to the discursive practices which enabled a continuous re-constitution of a Western security community. By re-constitution I refer to the Janus-faced process of activating and transforming foundational narratives which justify the existence and continuity of NATO. This process commonly includes constructions of threats and a sense of a shared identity which are both ingrained in symbolic orders and mobilized by articulations of a common security strategy. Of further interest, therefore, is how the allies answered the question why NATO should exist, how they invented and used a common notion of identity, interests, and threats in order to justify a deep and lasting pattern of military cooperation between North America and (Western) European states. Such a critical constructivist approach directs our attention to the political dynamics whereby a Western security community is invented in the first place instead of already presuming it as taken for granted (cf. Tilly, 1998; Bartelson, 2009; Herborth, 2009). It emphasizes that the practical usage of meaning imbues an act of political power with quite tremendous institutional consequences. Invented as a geopolitical community of solidarity in the early 1950s with a clear distinction of friends and enemies, NATO symbolized more than a classical military alliance. Compared to the ‘pledge’ of collective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4 emphasized that the allies ‘will consult together whenever . . . the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. Exactly this invocation of a political community made NATO’s evolution possible and enabled a smooth reorientation towards out-of-area missions and Eastern enlargement in the 1990s.