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NATO is an integrated military structure highly trained and schooled in both overt and subtle security planning.

Celeste A. Wallander Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War Author(s): Source: International Organization , Autumn, 2000, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601379

The integrated command structure as a general asset is crucial to understanding why NATO-and not other institutions, such as the UN or the Western European Union (WEU)-can act for post-Cold War military missions in Europe. "NATO has the military structure: look at Kosovo. The UN failed in Bosnia: it can do certain kinds of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions very well. But military missions require command and control, so this means NATO. Military command is crucial to what NATO does well."77 NATO has the headquarters with planning, logis- tics, and intelligence staffs, including military personnel who have all planned, trained, exercised, and schooled together for years and developed a deep trust.78 "If, for example, NATO were just the Article 5 commitment without any of its assets, it would be the WEU. What made NATO possible in the 1990s was what was devel- oped in the Cold War to deal with the Soviet threat and the alliance's internal tasks. One official said that the OSCE was considered as a vehicle for dealing with Yugosla- via, but officials recognized what it could and could not do. The OSCE is best at establishing norms and standards for political and human rights. "We do not need NATO for every security issue, but we did need it to be able to react to the ones that were on the agenda in the 1990s."80 Why were NATO's military command structure and political decision-making pro- cedures general, rather than specific, assets? Because, observed a senior defense official, "through its political consultation, integrated military command, and organi- zations for implementation, NATO is able to do the three things that have to be done for any policy: mobilize, organize, and implement."'81 Although developed during the Cold War, these capacities translate into post-Cold War missions and are crucial for multilateral security missions. While those who value efficiency bemoan NATO's slowness, the official noted, NATO "is not for maximum efficiency, but for acting together."82 Another official, when asked why NATO has been able to adapt, an- swered that it is because all political-military missions require planning, and "during the Cold War, that is what NATO did."83 And another official answered that it is NATO that has the tools for action, listing the integrated military command, logistics, command-control-communication, and the structures for coming to a coherent and cohesive consensus, whereas the UN and the OSCE do not.84 The political issues of non-Article 5 missions make the process more difficult, he observed, but the plan- ning mechanism is basically the same: procedures for generating forces and readi- ness are on the books, the militaries understand them, and governments are accus- tomed to and ready for them. However, just as clearly as Bosnia demonstrated that NATO's political consulta- tion and integrated command structures were general assets that made it adaptable to the new security environment of risks and non-Article 5 conditions, it also demon-strated that NATO lacked important specific military assets for dealing with out-of- area non-Article 5 contingencies. The alliance's potential new military missions re- quire smaller, lighter, and mobile forces with expertise and training in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement, in stark contrast to the Cold War mission of positional defense. This process of creating post-Cold War specific military assets began both among members and in conjunction with Partnership for Peace.

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