NATO is premised on western imperialism and means all their authors assume a cold war mindset that causes perpetual war
Andreas Behnke, Lecturer, International Relations Group that gathers the enormous and varied expertise on international politics and strategy in the Department of Politics and IR, MA (Mainz), PhD (Stockholm), 2000, 'Inscriptions of Imperial Order. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative', International Journal of Peace Studies 5(1), 61-83,
Discussions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role after the end of the cold war predominantly focus on its adaptation to the new security environment, the redefinition of its mission and the transformation of its military and political structures (Gordon, 1997; Kay, 1998; Yost, 1998). While this kind of literature is valuable in its own right, its underlying assumption about the adaptive logic of NATO's post-cold war policies tends to underrate the ability of the Alliance to actively shape the security environment through its discursive construction of security political 'realities' and the re-presentation of its institutional identity. At the same time, this literature arguably underestimates the task confronting NATO. The collapse of the cold war order does not only pose a problem to NATO in terms of adapting to a new reality, the features of which are are supposedly as clearly discernable as the ones of the cold war itself. Rather, its demise challenges NATO (and other international actors and institutions) to articulate new and stable 'structures of meaning' which can render "the unfamilar in the terms of the familiar" (Campbell, 1992:4) and which make it possible to re-assume political and military-strategic agency. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the way in which NATO is responding to these challenges. More specifically, it addresses the problem of the Alliance's 'Western' identity and the strategies of inclusion and exclusion through which this identity is re-defined and re-asserted after the disappearence of the constitutive Other of the cold war, that is, the Communist 'East'. At the same time, the essay deals with NATO's search for new adversaries and threats. These two issues, while often treated separately in the literature, are in fact closely related. As Owen Harries (1993:42) pointed out some years ago, The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy. We need not take Harries' skepticism at face value in order to appreciate the problematization of what the West actually is. Suffice it to state that matters of identity are intrinsically related to the problem of difference and adversity. The articulation of a Western identity, Harries' argument suggests, was made possible, and depended upon the presence of a hostile 'East'. As Bradley Klein (1994:120-21) has argued, this presence has allowed NATO to prevail and survive the many crises and internal conflicts amongst its member-states. Already in the 1960s, Henry Kissinger analyzed the effects of détente on alliance cohesion in terms that anticipate to some extent the troubles NATO would face some 30 years later after the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As the détente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. Defense against a military threat will soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them (Kissinger, 1965:10). In other words, in the absence of a 'life-threatening' adversary, the West runs the danger of disintegrating and dissolving. That NATO was able to avoid this fate for forty years supports Klein's (1994:121) contention that the alliance strength rested on its ability to wed itself "to the defense of a distinctly modern, Western, Atlantocentric cultural project" which made it possible to deflect and externalize its internal contradictions and conflicts. If we acknowledge this internal relationship between (stable) identity and (hostile) difference, we can appreciate the paradox that the end of the cold war presented a much more serious threat to NATO than the East-West confrontation ever did. For the end of the cold war also means that the unraveling of Cold War representations has raised for the first time the fundamental issue of Western identity. It is no longer clear who is to be legitimately incorporated within the space of modern Western culture. ... Simply put the world under NATO's guidance is no longer subject to containment. It's boundaries have now been eroded... (Klein, 1994:133). Consequently, the West faces the problem of 'self-determination', of defining its identity and its borders against the rest of the world. Self-determination is usually assumed to contribute to peace in the international system. Thus, the United Nations (UN) Charter states in Article 1, paragraph 2 as one of its purposes, To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.