The aff’s rhetoric of China as the enemy is telling of a self-fulfilling prophecy of societal failure in the US
Niv Horesh and Lim Kean Fan, May 2017, “The "China Model" as a Complicated Developmental Trope,” Project Muse, China: An International Journal, vol. 15 no. 2 pg. 166-176, muse.jhu.edu/article/661224, Niv Horesh (Niv.Horesh@durham.ac.uk, corresponding author) is Visiting Professor in China Studies at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, United Kingdom. He obtained his PhD in East Asian Studies from the Australian National University. His primary research interests include the world history of money, Shanghai's rise to prominence, foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and the East Asian developmental state model. Lim Kean Fan (keanfan.lim@nottingham.ac.uk) is Assistant Professor in Economic Geography at the School of Geography, the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom. He obtained his PhD in Economic Geography from the University of British Columbia. His primary research examines the relationship between place-specific policy experimentation and the structural coherence of the Chinese political economy. ZKMSU
Commentator Joshua Ramo had famously lumped various threads of narrative under the rubric of “Beijing Consensus”. Subsequently, that narrative took on new dimensions, both in China and abroad, countervailing along the way the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the organs behind globalising Anglo–American neo-liberal discourse (“Washington Consensus”).12 Then, why has Beijing’s narrative attracted so much attention if the Chinese experience is in reality so hard to define? It can be attributed mainly to an emergent insecurity among policymakers and the intelligentsia in Western Europe and North America about the validity of their own social and political values, and the salubrity of their own societies. Evidence to that effect can be found not merely in Brook’s litanies about the loss of American dynamism and the bumbling of the Barack Obama administration. More importantly, a growing body of academic literature has accumulated over the last few years to underscore how grossly unequally distributed income has become in the West. Many economists, not just on the far left, now indict the Ronald Reagan– Margaret Thatcher project of neo-liberalism for reversing the great post-war baby boomers’ march towards equal opportunity. Inequality seers like Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Picketty or Luigi Zingales may not necessarily agree about the health of the Chinese economy per se, but they certainly share a platform when it comes to inveighing against the godfathers of financial deregulation, which they see as the underlying cause of America’s post-2008 recession.13 To be sure, there has always been critical interest among American academe in the failings of the “system”, and in democratic “optimisation” of economic outcomes. Buchanan and Tullock’s pioneering 1962 work on public choice is a case in point. They sought a free-market-friendly mathematical formula that would curb the ability of vested-interest groups to bypass the will of the silent majority through, for example, “pork-barrelling” swing voters or “lobbying” career politicians. However, in the 1960s, even studies such as Buchanan and Tullock’s were informed by the “genius” of America’s founding fathers and its 1787 Constitution,14 whereas many commentators of different partisan persuasions today view the Constitution itself, if not the Union’s whole political architecture, as anachronistic and unfit for the purpose in that they paralyse decisionmaking in Washington.15 In search of new answers, the insecurity premise, as discussed earlier, has resurrected interest in the once-marginalised, “heterodox” economic theories, ranging from Mancur Olson, Hyman Minsky, Wolf Ladejinsky, Karl Polanyi to John K. Galbraith. All heterodox thinkers shared, in their time, deep-seated suspicion of the ability of free markets or representative democracy for that matter, to pre-empt the harbingers of resource misallocation. In other words, they rejected in one way or another neoclassical economic theory. As has been argued elsewhere, this disillusionment with neoclassical diktat has also led to renewed interest in the lessons that economic history, economic sociology and new institutional economics might offer, thus revitalising these three disciplines.16 Recent historically informed work by economists is now almost de rigueur and has gone well beyond the left-leaning circles. Taking issue with the root causes of the 2008 global financial crisis, such work—ranging from Reinhart and Rogoff’s rightleaning This Time is Different to Acemoglu and Robinson’s more centrist Why Nations Fail—harks back to several centuries earlier in its temporal scope. At the same time, older work by contrarian economic historians and economists that has been somewhat neglected in the 1980s, when neo-liberalism was fast advancing, found new readers among conventionally trained economists—from Paul Bairoch, Chalmers Johnston to Alice Amsden. Also, authors outside academe like Joe Studwell draw on that onceneglected work and converge on the view that the East Asian experience belies neoliberalism and exposes the small-government biases thereof.17 Freshly published, Studwell’s path-breaking and quantitatively-compelling research in economic history is further validating his insights. Allen and Lind have both respectively shown, for example, that unfree-market, big-government designs had not only typified the East Asian path to industrialisation. In fact, such grand design could also be attributed to America’s rise in the early 19th century. Baldly put, Allen, Lind and others argue that wealthier countries start preaching to poorer countries about the need for free trade (read: reduce tariffs designed to protect nascent industries) and the need to reduce government size (read: allow foreigners to buy out vital sectors of the national economy) only after they themselves had completed industrialisation on the back of very protectionist measures.18 For these reasons, the human rights discourse in the modern developed world is critiqued by scholars like Noam Chomsky, Daniel A. Bell and Martin Jacques as a values-laden, ahistorical sugarcoating of what is, in essence, crude economic interests of/in advanced capitalist countries. Much like “free markets” in neoclassical parlance, human rights are conceived of as bringing about immediate betterment of the human condition irrespective of time and place, whereas in the Chinese narrative “individual” rights and “markets” are both viewed as contingent on “collective will” and on evolutionary social reform. Yet, as Stiglitz alluded to, the wealthier “collectivist” China becomes, the harder it is to shrug off its affinity with the “individualistic” United States. While, on the right, some Western critics still cling to democracy-vs.-tyranny binary, and on the left, some critics starkly posit the American neo-imperialism vs. China’s “peaceful rise” thesis, both contending powers are in fact experiencing flagrantly unequal wealth distribution—they are both big polluters, big military spenders, capital-punishment enthusiasts; and they also incarcerate big segments of their population.19 Perhaps more importantly, not only are their logics of socio-economic regulation increasingly more similar to each other, they are now more economically interdependent than at any other point in history.20 Much of the self-doubt in America as well as the newfound interest in institutional economics, have, after all, to do with the fact that the “one man, one vote” system proved incapable of stalling the reversal of the post-war social contract in the West, which had in turn stamped out the spread of communism. Ironically, as Picketty poignantly shows, once the spectre of communism had diminished, inequality exploded.21 Recent works are very important in this context because they show—based on independently gathered polling data—that the absence of “one man, one vote” in China is not yet costing the CPC much popular support. Peerenboom, in particular, does much to dispel the fairly common Western notion that the peoples of the developing world would prefer a greater degree of democracy and social equality to raising of living standards in absolute terms.22 The argument, to be sure, might hold well beyond China. It specifically brings to mind Latin America: while that part of the world democratised relatively recently, in some cases following decades of oppressive dictatorship, most Latin Americans still seem to prize economic performance over universal suffrage. Moreover, a few democratically elected Latin American governments have arguably taken social inequality well beyond the norm under their dictatorial predecessors.23 US-based academics like Pei Minxin and Huang Yasheng often invoke India by way of an inspiration for the developing world that is alternative to the “China Model”; one that is more democratic and therefore one that would prove more economically compelling in the long run.24 After all, India is the biggest and one of the longestrunning democracies in Asia. However, as Drèze and Sen’s work indicates, the fact that the Gini coefficient for supposedly-communist China may now be higher than that of India conceals the tough everyday realities that the overwhelmingly rural populations of either country face. For Drèze and Sen, perhaps more instructive is the fact that Chinese economic reforms of the last three decades did not whittle away at arable land distribution. In India, by way of contrast, arable land distribution remains badly skewed despite Nehru’s socialist legacy.25 What this points to, then, is the need for any transfers of concrete policies and regulatory ideologies—in particular that of the supposedly superior neoliberal reason—to be contextually and historically grounded.